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ABSTRACT  According to my 2016 survey of ASU undergraduate students, 33% have used 
stimulant medications (e.g. Adderall or Ritalin) without a prescription to study. I view 
this practice as a step towards cognitive enhancement, which is the deliberate application 
of biotechnology to radically alter the human condition. From a foresight perspective, the 
ability to actively improve human beings, to take our evolutionary destiny into our own 
hands, may be a turning point on par with agriculture or the use of fossil fuels. The 
existential risks, however, may be greater than the benefits—and many of the most 
radical technologies have made little documented progress. 
I turn to an actual example where people are trying to make themselves 
marginally better at academic tasks, as a guide to how future transformative development 
in human enhancement may be incorporated into everyday practice. This project 
examines the history and context that led to the widespread use of stimulant medication 
on college campuses. I describe how Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), 
for which stimulant medication is prescribed and diverted, governs students, negotiates 
relationships between parents and school authorities, and manages anxieties resulting 
from a competitive neoliberal educational system.  I extend this archeology of ADHD 
through the actions and ethical beliefs of college students, and the bioethical arguments 
for and against human enhancement. Through this work, I open a new space for an 
expanded role for universities as institutions capable of creating experimental 
communities supporting ethical cognitive enhancement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Attention is the fundamental coin of the age. We pay attention before we pay 
anything else, and if not we soon come to regret the consequences of that lapse.  In a 
media culture where thousands of cable TV channels now seem like an evolutionary dead 
end compared to seemingly-infinite streaming music, video, and games on demand, 
where global markets provides billions of individual products, where the Western literary 
canon fits on a cheap handheld device and competes with 140 character-long hot takes, 
and where success in life seems to come either from grueling endurance in pursuit of 
excellence from pre-school through making partner, or the complete randomness of being 
on the right side of economic disruption, the ability to pay attention, to shift attention, to 
see through the barrage of marketing and temporary distractions to hard fact, is more 
important than ever before.  
Attention is what makes us us. Francis Crick, in a paper laying out a framework 
for progress in neuroscience, identified attention as the key link between sensory inputs 
and mental representations of the universe, and between the constant activation of 
neurons and purposeful and deliberate action. Understanding the neural basis of attention 
is, in his estimation, a key pre-requisite to grasping the ephemera that is the mind in a 
scientific manner. “Consciousness depends on certain coalitions that rest on the 
properties of very elaborate neural networks. We consider attention to consist of 
mechanisms that bias the competition among these nascent coalitions” (Crick & Koch, 
2003).  These mechanisms of attention underpin changes in thought from moment to the 
next, as well as differences in personality and character that make each person unique. 
 On a smaller scale, as educators we know the difference between engagement and 
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distraction, between the gaze and the glaze, and the way that students turn off the 
classroom when they turn on their computers and phones. In our own lives, constantly 
overworked, behind on grading, reading, and above all, writing, we are all squeezed 
between tasks.  One book of advice for scholars suggests squeezing work into every spare 
minute, the reductio ad absurdum of writing with one hand while stirring a pot of pasta 
with another (Johnson & Mullen, 2007).  There aren’t enough minutes in the day, but 
more so, there aren’t enough truly valuable minutes of deep concentration and original, 
creative, and rigorous thought.  Attention is the difference between a truly crafted and 
elegant argument, a jargon-filled inkcloud dashed off to meet some deadline, and the 
existential blank page of writer’s block.  It’s also the difference between a sustained and 
organized push on multiple projects, and an overwhelming slew of scattered distractions 
and unfinishable quagmires. 
 
The limits of attention are something that all of us experience, but what happens 
when failures of attention become clinical? Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) is a common diagnosis in contemporary America, usually first detected in 
childhood and then persisting through adulthood, characterized by failures to sustain 
attention on a task, by an inability to control impulses, by inappropriate energy in sedate 
settings, forgetfulness, thrill-seeking, and general maladaptive behavior. Unlike many 
mental illnesses, ADHD has an effective cure. Stimulants, chemical variants on 
amphetamines, sold under brand names with the foremost being Adderall, Ritalin, and 
Vynase, counteract the symptoms of ADHD quite effectively. It seems counter-intuitive 
that stimulants would treat hyperactivity, but current theories suggest that the medications 
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strengthen inhibitory neural structures in the brain, improving the higher-order functions 
that suppress impulsivity and distractibility. 
While a psychiatric diagnosis, ADHD cannot be encompassed in solely medical 
terms. The diagnostic criteria for ADHD reveals that it is a disorder of childhood 
education and failure to comply with the behavioral expectations of the classroom.  I take 
as the premise to my research that ADHD has proliferated to the extent that it has because 
it offers actionable solutions to individual classroom problems. A troublesome student, 
one not living up to his or her abilities, can be categorized, treated, and seen to improve 
in real-time. A torrent of bad behavior, modulated with the use of medication, is clear 
evidence that the treatment is working.  Seeing ADHD so readily is a consequence of a 
legal and policy environment in the United States that presents ADHD and other 
diagnoses as ready-made solutions to conflicts in the education arena. 
  One side effect of the prevalence of ADHD as a diagnosis is the availability of 
stimulant medication used to treat ADHD in institutions of higher learning.  I am 
particularly interested in the causes and consequences of the proliferation of ADHD, and 
how the application of psychiatric diagnoses to solve classroom problems modulates 
relationships between students, parents, agents of the state, and ideals like fairness and 
merit. A secondary interest is how the pills move through society, how the treatment goes 
feral outside of the singular doctor-patient relationship.  Non-prescription use of 
stimulant medication has been deemed a kind of “academic steroids” by students and 
commentators, with potentially corrosive effects on the intellectual integrity of higher 
education (Schwarz, 2012).  If pills can make a person smarter, what then becomes of 
hard work, talent, character, and similar values that we deem important? 
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This project has its origins in my personal history and concerns.  As an 
undergraduate at Caltech, I observed many of my friends would have difficulty handling 
the workload.  Multiple times, a friend would throw their hands in the air; declare that 
they had undiagnosed ADHD (possible but unlikely, given that these were all people who 
had made it through the filter of a 10% acceptance rate), and go to the school’s 
recommended psychiatrist, where they would invariably receive a prescription for 
Adderall, Ritalin, or in the case of one particularly picky friend, pure Dexedrine.  
Afterwards, they’d feel much better about doing math for 14 hours a day, seven days a 
week.  My experiences with the prevalence of stimulants at Caltech were extreme but not 
atypical, and years later I wondered why this had happened, and what it might mean for 
these people who would go on to work at the most innovative and profitable companies 
in Silicon Valley. 
My second impression is that in the early 21st century, with the mapping of the 
human genome, rising awareness of global climate change due to human activity, control 
of matter at the molecular and atomic scale, the exponentially increasing complexity, 
size, and presence of computers, it seems that humanity is standing at a precipice.  In 
particular, direct control over various aspects of human biology could lead to vastly 
extended lifespan, the migration of minds into computers, enhancement of physical, 
mental, and emotional capacities, and the development of whole new ones.  The 
Anthropocene may prove to be a very short era, as the creatures who inherit the Earth 
prove very different from naturally evolved human beings.  All of this is still science-
fiction, and is likely to remain so for some time, but I felt that what I was seeing were 
tentative steps towards deliberate enhancement of the mind.  Futurism is an art, rather 
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than a science, but the best practices balance disruption and continuity (Schwartz, 1996). 
The enhanced future, whether it trends towards a utopia of perfected human bodies and 
minds, or a dystopia of increasing medical risk and stratification along the lines of 
enhancement, can only come into being one day at a time, from the present status of the 
technologies used to improve human beings into an unknown future. 
However, impressions are not arguments.  As I pursued this project, I directed my 
research along three lines of inquiry to discover the evidence and observation that would 
help link these interests: 
1. How are college students using stimulant medication? Is the 
population of students using stimulant drugs in any way different from 
students in general? 
2. Why did the "ADHD epidemic", an observed 10x increase in diagnosis 
rates from 1980 to the present, happen?  What function does ADHD 
serve at the intersection of psychiatry, policy, and society? 
3. What does the current use of stimulant medication tell us about the 
potential for governing human enhancement and directing it towards 
beneficial ends? 
This research took me to places that were not on the original itinerary, along with lengthy 
journeys to areas I knew would matter: Congress in the 1970s and the conflicts that led to 
creation of contemporary disability rights; hospital-schools in New Jersey in 1939; 
Presidential bioethics reports and psychedelic cyborg enthusiasts; the editorial struggle 
that redefined American psychiatry with the DSM-III; and German children’s books from 
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1844.  Throughout the process, I have attempted to attend to the fraught and contingent 
processes of history, as well as the overall orderings of the world.  
Chapter 1 discusses the history of ADHD, and the ways that ADHD has been 
used as an exemplar of Peter Conrad’s medicalization paradigm, an approach that sees 
diagnoses like ADHD as a part of a project of expansion of pathology into new and wider 
terrains, and the domination of medical knowledge over other forms of knowing.  
Medicalization and its natural theoretical counterpart, a whiggish medical triumphalism 
which describes a history of increasing accuracy of diagnosis and quality of care, are 
inadequate to understand the past and current status of ADHD. My research describes a 
discontinuous history of ADHD, with mutually incommensurable definitions of the 
disease around moral will, undetectable brain damage, and finally symptom-based 
criteria. The current definition, dating from the 1980 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-
III, demonstrates a particular robustness by combining a unique space in the modern 
ordering of psychiatric symptoms with immediate and positive response to stimulant 
medication.  
Chapter 2 delves into changes in American disability law, from early attempts to 
provide basic sustenance for deserving disabled individuals like veterans, children, and 
victims of industrial accidents. This public beneficence approach, which originated in 
Christian charity and reached fulfillment in the Progressive movement of the early 20th 
century, was radically upset by the almost accidental creation of explicit rights for people 
with disabilities in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  For the first time, it 
was recognized in Federal law that people with disabilities suffered from discrimination. 
Providing remedies for this discrimination required adjustments in physical architecture, 
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hiring specialized staff, and training teachers, financial burdens on the states. Ensuring 
that the new rights were in fact going to the proper beneficiaries required negotiating the 
legal boundaries of disabilities and creating a set of procedures that paired access with 
demonstrating a burden of proof that the disability was objectively real .  I focus 
particularly on the process of creating educational accommodations in primary and 
secondary schools via the Individualized Education Plan (IEP), which serves as a 
common model for accommodations for learning disabilities, including ADHD, in 
colleges. Continuing through the Americans with Disabilities Act, I finish by noting the 
limits and contradictions of rights-based approaches. While activists sought to 
“demedicalize” their own conditions, in the legal regimes established under the ADA, 
persons with disabilities could only prove discrimination after a combined legal-medical 
judgment of their conditions. I suggest that beyond the totalitarian examples of biopower 
used by Agamben in Homo Sacer (1998a), the workings of disability law and the creation 
of accommodations provide an example of how liberal democracies manage their 
populations today. 
In Chapter 3, I continue with a detailed look at how disability accommodations 
are created and managed. Legal mandates to provide access for students lead to 
professional standards and technological infrastructure to create that access.  Education 
serves many purposes, and I compare the role of ADHD across a classically liberal and 
neoliberal educational system.  While these two rationalities, modes of thinking about 
what features of the universe, share vocabulary and some practices, their differing ends 
creates differences in institutional design and educational experience for both students 
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and teachers.  ADHD represents a point of stability that articulates unspoken neoliberal 
anxieties into widely accepted liberal solutions.  
Chapter 4 describes the results of a survey completed by 203 undergraduates, 
which asked questions about the prevalence of stimulant medication use, perceptions of 
the prevalence of stimulant medication, and the ethical reasoning of students about the 
use of stimulant medication, which has been described as a form of “academic steroids,” 
in comparison to other forms of academic misconduct. 7% of my respondents had a 
prescription for stimulant medication, 38% in total had used them at some point, and that 
stimulant medication is widely available on campus through loose networks of friends 
and acquaintances.  Students ranked the use of stimulant medication without a 
prescription as the least serious form of academic misconduct.  There was no detectable 
difference in GPA, or views on fairness or competitiveness, between students who did 
and did not use stimulant medication. 
 Chapter 5 delves deeply into the ideology and program of transhumanism, a 
movement based around the potential to use applied technology to fundamentally recreate 
human beings as individuals and as species. Transhumanists believe that the time has 
come for humans to take control of their evolutionary destiny, to banish the specter of 
death, and to give people the chance to overcome biological limitations.  Within the 
transhumanist program, there are deep divides between groups pursuing cryonic 
suspension, the uploading of minds, and biological immortality.  Transhumanism has 
attracted a great deal of serious criticism for threatening human nature as a basic 
underpinning of political rights and ethical standards.  I suggest that the medical and 
rights-making practices described in this dissertation, along with the non-prescription use 
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of stimulant medication by students today, offers a space in which universities can 
exercise positive democratic governance over human enhancement. There is an 
opportunity to give the transhumanist experiment institutional backing that it has not 
enjoyed, while at the same time grounding it in the liberal values of egalitarian 
meritocracy. 
Throughout this project I have used three theoretical lenses as the basis of my 
thinking about science, society, the use of technological artifacts, and the aims of policy. 
Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern (1993) casts the modern stance as defined by two 
contradictory acts: ‘translation’ creates hybrids of nature and culture, quasi-objects that 
trace social networks and are comprised of physical-natural objects.  Simultaneously, 
modernism ‘purifies’ the world into the human realm of culture and the scientific realm 
of nature. The power of the modernist constitution is its ability to shift effortlessly 
between the poles of nature and culture, depending on what perspective makes subjects 
more manipulable. The weakness of modernism, in Latour’s framing, is that hybrids 
proliferate even as we deny their existence—that the hybrid quasi-objects in the world 
exist beyond understanding and therefore effective analysis or governance. Hybrids must 
be purified before they can be dealt with, and to return to ADHD, most analysis sees the 
problem as one of medicine, or education and disability, or drug control. Some wider 
theorizations see it as symptomatic as of a crisis in capitalism or post-industrial society. 
The attempts to make sense of ADHD in one aspect are incomplete but this assessment 
will try and capture ADHD and amphetamines in a holistic, hybrid manner. 
Latour’s hybrid networks are slippery things to work with, and Jasanoff’s idiom 
of co-production (2004) can be seen as an attempt to tame the concept and make the 
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mutual interactions of technoscience and society visible to scholars. Co-production takes 
the ordering of nature through science and the ordering of society through power and 
culture as products of the same act, noting that power and knowledge are intimately 
related, that scientific and technological acts are also political statements, and that 
political legitimacy depends on the ability of science to speak for nature.  Co-production 
centers on several themes: the emergence and stabilization of new technoscientific 
objects and framings, the resolution of controversies, the intelligibility and portability of 
objects across boundaries and domains, and the adjustments of scientific practices to 
cultural contexts. The pathways of co-production are in the making of identities, 
institutions, discourses, and representations. Through this work, I aim to show how 
ADHD has created a new discourse of mental health and human efficiency, an identity of 
the ‘problematic but successful’ ADHD subject, and influenced the design and 
procedures of educational and medical institutions. 
Foucault’s theories of Biopolitics (1990), of disciplining souls (1988), of the 
inextricable ties between scientific progress and the modern order of the universe (1976), 
weave throughout this piece. Little can be said about Foucault that has not been said, but 
I see in his theories more than just domination and power. I see a way in which people 
enroll themselves in projects of structuring and ordering, of making their own cares 
comprehensible to an uncaring bureaucratic machine, and above all, of reducing the 
emotional burden of their own care.  
The prevalence of ADHD in our lives calls into question what happens when the 
abnormal becomes normalized. ADHD is all the pressures of modern life and our human 
inadequacy in the face of them compressed into a four-letter acronym, a diagnosis that 
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links a theory of mind to the practice of education, a category that balances the ideals of 
equality with the reality of competition.  In this work, I want to focus on the details 
across many areas and several decades, to show the hard work that goes into realizing 
new political rights and stabilizing the forms of knowledge concomitant with those rights.  
I want to explore one of the contradictions of modernity, and how an individual health 
solution can become a collective moral problem. I want to see what people raised in this 
milieu think and experience in their process of becoming adults, and compare it to very 
different ways of conceptualizing what a human being is, and how a life is supposed to be 
lived.  Because ultimately, we will not leap boldly into a future where everything is new 
and strange; we get there one day at a time, building on the world that we see around us 
today.  
Now, let us attend…  
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1. PROBLEMATIZING ADHD 
Is there such a thing as pure Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), a 
psychiatric disorder free of political and social entanglements? An approached premised 
on purity would start and end with biology and behavior, without acknowledging the 
historical or social contingencies that make the disorder a durable feature of life for 
millions of people.  Somewhere within the changing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM)—the complex index of mental illnesses published by the American Psychiatric 
Association, the scientific, scholarly, and popular literature, there is a true essence of 
ADHD the effects of which can be traced out in society. This approach would put the cart 
before the horse. Rather than hunting for some underlying reality, this project takes a 
construction approach that analyzes ADHD as a problem. Problematizing ADHD invokes 
the multiplicity of actors and agents involved, and orients this project towards how the 
entity acts in the world, rather than what it is, or what it is called. For whom is ADHD a 
problem? Why is it a problem? How is that problem solved in both individual cases and 
on a general basis?  
A note on nomenclature: ADHD has had many names and labels over time, while 
noting that there are differences between Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, 
Attention Deficit Disorder with or without Hyperactivity, and Minimal Brain 
Dysfunction, for the purposes of clarity, I will maintain the contemporary usage of 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, without ascribing exact similarity between what 
doctors today call ADHD and the different diseases that their predecessors researched 
and treated. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and assess ADHD and stimulant drugs 
as technologies; a problem-solution dyad that exists in psychiatric and personal framings.  
This chapter reviews the literature on medicalization and pharmaceuticalization, major 
sociological and anthropologic frameworks used to understand ADHD and stimulant 
medication, and puts them in conversation with science and technology studies theories 
about technology.  
This chapter is most concerned with ADHD as a diagnosis, as a form of 
knowledge, but this is applied knowledge that only gains salience due to the mobility of 
stimulant medications. There are many possible definitions of technology, but I have 
found two particularly illuminating. W. Brian Arthur, an economist and complexity 
theory expert with the Sante Fe Institute, describes technology as “As assemblage of 
components and practices applying one or more physical principles to fulfill human 
needs, [emphasis mine]” focusing on the modularity and expandability of technologies 
across domains governed by different natural laws (Arthur, 2009, p.28).  Bjiker and Pinch 
(1984) of the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) school note that the success or 
failure of a technology in the world are associated with a condition of social closure as 
defined by those who make, use, and are affected by a technology. Closed technologies 
have familiar, stable forms. Arthur’s definition draws our attention to physical actions 
and human needs; Pinch and Bjiker to reliability, settlement, and relevant interest groups.  
Precisely measured doses of stimulants introduced to bodies and thence brains in order to 
fulfill a variety of human needs for energy, attention, focus, weight loss, competitive 
advantage, pleasure, can be seen as part of Arthur’s complexity theory of technology, but 
they are the most immediate material instantiations of a social process of diagnosis and 
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amelioration.  ADHD is a social technology as much as a disease: a way of achieving 
reliably similar results for people across diverse settings, thereby ensuring that the 
different people are treated equitably by the same institution, or that one person can 
expect coordinated treatment under different regimes of knowledge.  ADHD becomes 
particularly “social” when it departs the medical regime (covered in this chapter) and 
interacts with legal and educational practices (Chapters 2 & 3). 
Medicalization and its Discontents  
Medicalization is the classic lens through which ADHD is understood. As 
developed by Peter Conrad, medicalization refers to the process by which difficulties 
with living beings become defined in medical terms: as disease with prognoses and 
treatments. It is the expansion of discourses of health and illness into areas in which those 
terms did not previously apply, the creation and maintenance of biological and 
psychosocial norms and forms of deviance, and the role of medical professionals in 
describing and ‘signing off’ on medicalized problems in other social areas—such as 
disability in education or mental competence in criminal justice.  Medicalization theory 
criticizes the narrowing range of acceptable diversity in life, the transformation of 
collective problems to individual medical issues, and an increase in medical control. 
 It is impossible to discuss problematizing ADHD without using medicalization. 
ADHD served as the first case study in Conrad’s (1976) development of medicalization, 
and he and other scholars have continued to expand on this work in the decades since 
(Malacrida, 2004). In the medicalization framework, ADHD is primarily about the 
expansion of medical controls into childhood and education; transforming the 
15 
rambunctious or exuberant child into the abnormal ADHD sufferer.  Subsequent work 
has focused on the medicalization of under-performance via ADHD and diagnosis 
seeking behavior by adults—a process of blame shifting from conscious choices to innate 
biology (Conrad, 2007, p. 46-69). Patient advocacy groups such as Children and Adults 
with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD), pharmaceutical giants like 
Ritalin manufacturer Ciba-Geigy, and diagnostic institutions including the American 
Psychological Association and managed care firms, mutually interact to solidify the 
ADHD diagnosis in public consciousness and ordinary use (Conrad, 2007, p.70-96). 
  Medicalization has made important contributions towards scholarship, 
particularly in connecting Foucault’s theories about the clinical gaze and discourses of 
modernity to contemporary anthropological and sociological fieldwork (Foucault, 1994).  
Medicalization places daily interactions and institutions of medicine as part of broader 
project of modernity: a rational progressive movement towards ordered, efficient, and 
free human interactions.  However, medicalization has led to a shallow understanding of 
the interaction between psychiatry and society as primarily colonial, and one with little 
remedy for the subjects of over-medicalization. . As a form of critique, medicalization 
implies as its counterpart demedicalization, a process of removing medical influences that 
is has been observed in a handful of cases around homosexuality and masturbation 
(Davis, 2006). 
 Medicalization draws much of its basic influences and frameworks from the anti-
psychiatry movement of the 1950s and 1960s, such as the works of Szasz and Illich 
(1975).  These critiques of psychiatry depicted the field as not only non-scientific, but 
also interested in extending human suffering rather than alleviating it (Szasz, 2010). 
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Though there is a common thread from anti-psychiatry through science and technology 
studies that knowledge, including psychiatric knowledge is constructed, the anti-
psychiatry movement moves rather farther from the basic position that there is no such 
thing as simple access to nature and that the construction of knowledge is a labor 
intensive process with social and political commitments, to the radical position that such 
knowledge is essential fictitious, representing the preferences of existing elites rather than 
having any correspondence with an external reality. While anti-psychiatry arguments, 
based on disrupting received authority, made headway against the therapeutic mirror that 
described the basic relationships of psychoanalysis (Foucault, 1988), the scientific and 
statistical basis of the DSM-III and its revisions has proven resistant against these same 
arguments (Latour, 1987). The criticism of ADHD has not evolved in sync with its 
object.  
Pharmaceuticalization is a relatively recent sociological frame for understanding 
medical trends. A development of the medicalization thesis, pharmaceuticalization 
examines “translation or transformation of human conditions capabilities, and capacities 
into opportunities for pharmaceutical intervention” (Williams, Martin, & Gabe, 2011). 
Pharmaceuticalization substantially differs from medicalization in taking as its focus the 
materiality of drugs, and their use in non-medical settings for performance enhancement 
or pleasure in addition to healing (Bell & Figert, 2012). Doctors and medical authority 
are decentered, becoming one of many interest groups that also include pharmaceutical 
corporations, patient advocacy and consumer groups, and the regulatory bodies of nation-
states.  The six sociological dimensions of pharmaceuticalization map neatly onto issues 
and current status of ADHD; particularly the redefinition of health problems in terms of 
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pharmaceutical solutions (the focus of this chapter) and the way that those 
pharmaceuticals are understood as commonplace objects (Chapter 4), and a future based 
around human enhancement (Chapter 5). 
i. the redefinition or reconfiguration of health problems as having a 
pharmaceutical solution;  
ii. the changing relationship between state regulatory agencies and the 
pharmaceutical industry;  
iii. the mediation of pharmaceuticals in popular culture and daily life  
iv. the creation of new techno-social identities and the mobilization of 
patient or consumer groups around drugs;  
v. the use of drugs for non-medical (enhancement) purposes and the 
creation of new consumer markets, and finally; 
vi. drug innovation and the colonization of health futures, albeit in an 
industry plagued by a major crisis over productivity and innovation. 
(Williams, Martin, & Gabe, 2011) 
Pharmaceuticalization and medicalization make important contributions to the 
study of ADHD, but it is important to be aware of the limits to these theories.  The “pill” 
quality of stimulants is important to how substances move so easily from prescribing 
physicians to users and then to a grey market explored more fully in Chapter 4, however 
a purely pharmaceuticalized approach risks ascribing more agency than is warranted to 
material objects. Medicalization casts arguments about the definition of disease as 
primarily about power and authority, without due consideration of the difficulties of 
healthcare. To these theories I add an epistemic dimension. Knowledge, and the ways in 
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which knowledge is rendered intelligible by expert groups as part of a coherent plan for 
ordering the world, as well as moved from within the domain of experts to the 
understanding of laypeople like patients, general practitioners, and students,  
ADHD Across Psychiatry 
Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals have multiple goals: the well-
being and care of their patients; the professional power and prestige to make a diagnosis 
and treatment ‘portable’ from their office to any other setting that the patient may 
encounter; the internal coherence of theories of mental illness, and historical continuity 
with prior diagnoses concepts. Per coproduction, knowledge/power is inextricably linked. 
Though all medical knowledge is a matter of professional consensus (Aronowitz, 2011; 
Rosenberg, 2002), disease definitions that shift radically make this socially constructed 
knowledge appear artefactual as opposed to factual. A diagnosis that does not lie neatly 
with other mental disorders is an isolated fact: weak, unlikely to be taken up, and liable to 
be deconstructed (Latour, 1987). Without valid knowledge, mental health professionals 
lack the power to make their recommendations portable and enlist others including 
patients, but extending to families, educators, administrators, etc. in the process of care.  
Conversely, any intervention that produces an improved healthcare outcome will draw a 
blanket of knowledge around it, even if the precise causal mechanisms of the 
improvement are not understood. 
 Historians of ADHD trace the origins of the disease to the late 18th century, 
coinciding with Foucualt’s (1988) identification of the confinement of the mentally ill in 
asylums as a distinct form of governmentality (Lange, 2010). Doctors, empowered by the 
state to collect and confine the population of mentally ill, and inspired by Enlightment 
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ideals of rationality, began a process of categorizing and describing madness, including 
the predecessors of ADHD.  Medicine aspired to the status of a science via the clinical 
gaze, the regularized examination and classification of organs, lesions, changes in signs 
over time. However, even these basic facts require interpretation and theory. A fact which 
does not fit into a theory tends to be discarded (Kuhn, 1996). In psychiatry, more theory 
driven than other sciences, the traces of a disease must fit into theory.  
Heinrich Hoffman, a German physician and satirical writer, created the first 
popular depiction of ADHD with his Fidgety Philip/Zappel Philipp children’s story about 
a boy who can’t sit still and annoys his parents by destroying dinner when he falls out of 
his chair, taking the entire tablesetting with him. Fidgety Philip has been described as a 
classic portrayal of the conflict between parents and children, and is frequently invoked 
in contemporary discussions of ADHD (Goodwin, 2010). 
Sir Alexander Crichton (1798), a Scottish physician, wrote a three volume clinical 
study of mental derangements, including a chapter on “On Attention and its Diseases.” 
Crichton theorized a pathology of opposed poles of over or under sensitized nerves, 
whereby a sufferer would be unable to attend to any one thing, would be agitated by the 
slightest distractions such as people walking in an adjacent hall, or a slight excess of heat, 
cold, or light, leading to a particular delirium Crichton describes as the “the fidgets.” 
The third historical touchstone is the lectures of George Still (1902) on moral will.  
Still, considered the father of British pediatrics, delivered a lecture to the Royal College 
of Physicians in 1902, considering the possibility of children who pass as having normal 
intellectual, but who nonetheless suffer from a grave morbid mental defect. Still’s moral 
control, defined as ability to act in such a such a manner as for the good of all, is 
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dependent on inhibitory volition, the ability to control impulses and movement, the 
development of which is a natural part of child development. Still notes that of the many 
“morons”, “idiots”, and “imbeciles” that he observes (at the time, these were medical 
terms (Carson, 2007)), 23 of 90 exhibit clear deficits in moral will, above and beyond 
what would be expected from their general level of mental impairment. His case studies, 
are however mix many modern disorders together, including “spitefulness and cruelty” 
and “lawlessness” as major diagnostic features along with “passionateness”, the reactive 
and automatic rejection of authority and constraint characteristic of the modern diagnosis 
of Oppositional Defiant Disorder, and one example of what is clearly dyslexia to modern 
eyes. Despite their retrograde tone, the Still lectures are regarded as important because 
they represent the first scientific-medical description of ADHD, as opposed to 
unorganized anecdotes.1 
Still’s lectures represent a key touchstone today, but they did not gain currency 
with the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud which came to dominate the field in 
the 1920s and 30s. ADHD does not fit into psychoanalytic categories. It is not neurosis, 
stemming from deep-seated psychic wounds, or a psychosis characterized by completely 
disabling delusions. The best attempt that Freudians could make for explaining their 
version of ADHD was that it was a physical reaction to childhood neurosis, a milder kin 
to Freud’s famous case study of somatoformic blindness or paralysis. Even in infancy, 
minds could exhibit psychic wounds, which manifested as bad behavior during the vital 
                                                 
1 Compare generally positive comments on Still (Barkley, 2006) to negative comments on Crichton  (Barkley, 2008). The fact that the present ‘dean’ of ADHD devotes energy to reconstructing century-old arguments is fascinating.  
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latency period between the ages of five and puberty. In the view of prominent childhood 
analysts Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, the fidgeting and distractibility characteristic of 
childhood ADHD were symptoms of underlying psychic tension and conflict between the 
emerging self and the familial environment. Anxiety and compulsion, filtered through the 
atypical development of a fragmented ego, could only be resolved by putting the entire 
family through psychoanalysis; a therapeutic approach with limited chances of success 
(Rafalovich, 2001). 
While ADHD is a psychoanalytic orphan, it provides a rich avenue of research for 
pharmacological and behavioral research. Modern stimulant medications trace their 
origins to Gordon Alles, a California based chemist in the 1920s who investigated 
synthetic variants of ephedra and adrenaline in the search for an effective anti-asthma 
drug. His 1929 experiments with beta-phenyl-isopropylamine, now called amphetamines, 
revealed decongestant effects along with strong central nervous system stimulation, 
although these were not the results Alles searched for. In 1934, Alles approached the 
Philadelphia pharmaceutical firm of Smith, Kline & French (SKF), which had just 
released a decongestant inhaler containing Benzedrine, an amphetamine salt. 
Negotiations over patent rights led to a fruitful partnership between Alles and SKF, a 
small and ambitious company seeking new compounds to gain market share against then 
industry leaders Merck and Lilly. In the 1930s, regulations for pharmaceutical testing 
were much less stringent, and SFK supplied Benzedrine to any doctor conducting 
research (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 25-52). 
One of these doctors was Dr. Charles Bradley, chief psychiatrist at the Emma 
Pendleton Bradley Home, a children’s hospital founded by Bradley’s great-uncle in honor 
22 
of a daughter who suffered from encephalitis. The Emma Pendelton Bradley Home was a 
Progressive-era residential hospital-school, a sprawling wooded estate that offered care 
and education to children with behavior disorders, while providing ample raw clinical 
material for Dr. Bradley’s neurological research (Byrom, 2001).  Bradley investigated the 
neural origins of his patients’ behavior disorders with pneumoencephalography: an 
invasive imaging technique that involved draining most of the cerebrospinal fluid from 
the brain and replacing it with air, thereby increasing the level of brain detail revealed in 
cranial X-rays. Bradley experimented with Benzedrine to counter the painful headaches 
caused by pneumoencephalograms. While the headaches persisted, Bradley noticed that 
approximately half of his patients exhibited a remarkable improvement in behavior, 
becoming calmer and more driven. He published initial results in 1937, and a fuller study 
of 100 children in 1940; these papers were the first studies to link stimulant medication to 
the normalization of deviant behavior in an educational context (Strohl, 2011; Bromley, 
2006). 
 Bradley’s work lay fallow for decades, although some child psychiatrists 
experimented with methylpendidate (sold under the brand name Ritalin) as a treatment 
for hyperactivity. A sort of clinical folklore developed around ‘minimal brain 
dysfunction’, under the assumption that since children with visible brain damage are 
often hyperactive, hyperactive children must suffer from some as of yet unseen form of 
brain damage. In this environment, a major contribution to ADHD was the work of 
Canadian psychiatrist Virginia Douglas, who combined a battery of studies using 
common psychological and learning disability tests to show that children of normal 
intelligence, reported by parents and teacher for symptoms of hyperactivity, demonstrated 
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common inabilities to “stop, look, and listen”, to consistently perform tasks requiring 
care and concentration, even when their best performance on these tasks matched that of 
normal students. Douglas also found in her study (partially funded by Ciba, 
manufacturers of Ritalin), that methylpendidate improved the performance of her subjects 
on all tests. Douglas proposed that her “stop, look, and listen” dimension described an 
important factor for all children, used to learn and cope with a wide range of situations, 
and even become a moral actor. Though the exact brain mechanisms behind normal 
attention and abnormal ADHD were unknown, and the EEG probes insufficiently 
powerful in resolution or precision to reveal them, Douglas believed that the broad 
spectrum of evidence conclusively demonstrated the existence and importance of a real 
attention-based syndrome (Douglas, 1972). 
The DSM-III and Modern ADHD 
The ‘atheoretical’ approach of the DSM-III (APA, 1980) opened a space in which 
ADHD could flourish as a distinct disorder. In the late 1960s and 70s, the psychoanalytic 
establishment entered a period of crisis, under cultural attack from post-modernist and 
anti-psychiatric critics outside the profession, and from medical critics within.  For these 
internal reformers, psychoanalytic frameworks were flawed primarily because of their 
dismal inter-rater reliability: two psychiatrists making a diagnosis of a patient off of the 
same clinical interaction were unlikely to agree on the same diagnosis. Psychoanalysts, 
unable to come to consensus on basic terms and frameworks, were even less able to 
incorporate new psychiatric techniques, including the first generation of anti-psychotic 
medications, or provide meaningful guidance for the future of psychiatric research. 
 In this environment, Dr. Robert Spitzer and his fellow neo-Kraepelian reformers, 
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drew up a system of mental illness based not on any overarching conception of the mind 
and its illnesses, but rather on finite lists of possible symptoms, designed with the aim of 
making it easy for psychiatrists to distinguish between alternative diagnoses (Compton & 
Guze, 1995). The new descriptive psychiatry made it easy to distinguish ADHD from 
other mental disorders, such as anxiety, depression, or learning disorders. The criterion 
based on inattention and hyperactivity in two or more settings at the ages of seven and 
up, served to clearly define ADHD. Psychiatrists who done had key research on ADHD, 
Paul Wender and Dennis Cantwell, made important contributions to writing the criterion 
used in the DSM-III. Wender, who had worked on ADHD since 1971 with his 
monograph on Minimal Brain Dysfunction in Children, was adamant in advocating that 
the disorder was more than a childhood condition, and that while it was first detected in 
childhood, it persisted into adulthood. While Wender’s concept of a “residual ADD” was 
removed from later versions of the DSM, his arguments were key in the current 
understanding of the disorder as a widespread mild condition that can fairly be applied to 
adults as well as children (Decker, 2013, p. 273). 
The authors of the DSM-III intended a radical break with the past. Their 
intentions were to align the field with advances in research and treatment and to discard 
the hoary theories of mind which stood in the way of scientific studies with firm 
statistical validity. Spitzer’s energetic and involved management style, combined with the 
institutional lethargy of the psychoanalytic school, removed psychoanalysis from 
psychiatry altogether. More than just a handbook for clinicians, the DSM-III provided a 
classificatory alignment with the International Classification of Disease (ICD-9), the 
financial reimbursement systems of health insurance and managed care, and research 
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grants administered through the National Institutes of Health. The diversity of DSM-III 
mental disorders could be seen not as differing responses to personal psychic trauma, but 
as unique and independent disease entities, grouped by their observed effects on 
personality, cognition, and emotion, rather than a single underlying cause (Decker, 2013). 
As it exists today, ADHD represents a nearly perfect “solved” psychiatric 
problem. Though the DSM definition of ADHD has shifted since the DSM-III, the 
changes are evolutionary rather than revolutionary, responding to concerns within the 
scientific community (Willcutt et al, 2012). Treatment via stimulant medication is an easy 
intervention with a reasonable chance of success. Finding ADHD in a patient implies a 
relatively easy intervention with a good chance of improving symptoms.  While the 
etiology is relatively unknown, a high degree of heritability implies a genetic basis to be 
discovered. Attention and executive functioning are fruitful areas for neurological 
imaging, with the promise both of increased general understanding of the mind and a 
future medical imaging test for ADHD, the final legitimation of a psychiatric disorder as 
a medical disorder (Bobb et al, 2006). 
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Living with ADHD 
When discussing the broader theory, implications, and deconstruction of a 
disorder, it is important to not lose sight of the person at the center of the cloud of 
possibilities. ADHD can be the source of suffering and personal anguish. Hallowell and 
Ratey’s (1994) Driven to Distraction, a 1994 guide to recognizing and coping with 
ADHD, provides a particularly sensitive view of the personal aspects of living with 
ADHD. Hallowell begins the book by describing his own case of ADHD, which he 
discovered at age 31 near the end of his training in child psychiatry while attending a 
lecture. The label put his life history in context, descriptions like “daydreamer”, “lazy”, 
and “spaces out” become part of a cognitive style with benefits as well as disadvantages. 
The medical confessional, as much as the DSM, serves as an entry point into the 
world of ADHD. The literature contrasts missed opportunities due to disorganization, and 
lives ruined through risk-taking self-stimulating behavior characteristic, with being 
interested, “type A”, jumping from situation to situation with ease. The ultimate success 
(at least for these authors) is finishing their own self-help book. The personal confession 
and sharing of strategies for redirecting energy and distractibility into safe avenues for 
growth is characteristic of contemporary discourse around ADHD. While some people 
find solace in being able to tie their life difficulties to a widespread medical phenomenon, 
individual resistance to labelling is at the heart of many efforts to demedicalize ADHD. 
People want to see themselves as ‘more than just a diagnosis,’ or believe that the 
literature does not adequately include all the beneficial aspects of the ADHD personality 
type (Timimi & Leo, 2009). 
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Stimulant medication represents a second source of ambivalence within the 
personal problematization of ADHD.  With stimulants, ADHD is an exemplar of a 
managed illness. However, living a life oriented around drugs and being constantly 
“wired” is exhausting. Adults may choose to medicate only when they feel particularly 
distracted, while many child psychiatrists recommend ‘drug holidays’, days without 
medication, as a regular part of the course of treatment. Drug holidays and the 
misdirection of pills are linked. While as a scheduled substance, prescriptions are 
controlled and not automatically refilled, patients may not take their pills every day of the 
month, leaving extra medication to be stockpiled, sold, or given away. 
Conclusion: Materiality and the Technology of Medicine 
 This chapter demonstrates how ADHD became “closed” as a diagnosis in the 
SCOT sense of “closure”. Closure occurs when multiple stakeholders converge on a 
single definition of a technology, which may work for different reasons.  In the case of 
ADHD, the defined ordering of mental illnesses sought by the neo-Kraepelians 
intersected with the desires of clinicians and patients for a detectable and treatable 
diagnosis.  The social and political dimensions of the disorder, to be discussed in depth in 
the next chapters, are as important as the epistemic and material dimensions, and not 
adequately encompassed by medicalization or pharmaceuticalization theories.   
This argument reframes claims of an “ADHD Epidemic.” While accepting the 
significant increase in cases of ADHD in the United States between 1970 and 2010 (Sclar 
et al, 2012), that increase in fact indicates the existence of a new disease, rather than the 
rise of an older disorder. A closer look reveals stuttering progress and medical 
developments separated by decades, which have been retrospectively wound into a 
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genealogy to provide historical weight to current practices around ADHD. Both medical 
and medicalization theory explanations of the “ADHD Epidemic” partake of sociology of 
error approach: either psychiatrists were wrong then or wrong now, and either way the 
diagnosis has been mismanaged. The prevalence of ADHD is correct at both dates, and 
that the “ADHD Epidemic” reflects both diagnostic fluidity and cultural and political 
changes that have made ADHD more salient. While it is possible to talk of ADHD now 
and in the early 20th century, seeing them as simply the same thing is a mistake not born 
out by the fragmented history of attempts to make sense of a cluster of ADHD-like 
symptoms. 
ADHD has expanded because it is so useful for so many people. It is a treatable 
disease for a form of psychiatry which has turned against long-term talk therapy in favor 
of the observation/action cycle of diagnosis and prescription of drugs.  Stimulant 
medications have immediately visible effects on the body and mind, with short-term 
benefits in the classroom.2 The discourse of ADHD provides a way to turn an individual 
life history characterized by distraction and hyperactivity into a common identity. And 
however stimulant medications act on the brain, however the increased levels of 
norepinephrine and dopamine modify neural activity, stimulant medications provide a 
sense of focus and purpose to people with ADHD in excess of their generally energetic 
and pleasurable effects on the population. This individual, subjective, and yet very 
replicable fact is at the heart of the durability of ADHD.  Without a treatment, there 
would be no disease.  
                                                 
2 As an aside, milder stimulants such as caffeine are used as a super-placebos in studies, under the logic that since test subjects sense the side-effects, they are more likely to generate a placebo effect. 
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2. DISABILITY RIGHTS AND BIOPOLITICS 
ADHD solved more than the psychiatric problems explored in the last chapter. 
The expansion of ADHD can be fruitfully explained as consequence of the constrained 
choices that educators, parents, students, and medical professionals can make in 
accordance with laws creating and enforcing disability rights. This approach explicitly 
adds a political dimension to treating ADHD as an interactive kind, a label that loops 
back to influence the categories of people in the world (Hacking, 2001 p. 90). While it 
may seem trivial that the category ADHD changes how people with ADHD see 
themselves, and that changes in how patients present may thereby change how the 
diagnosis is understood, ADHD as an individual mental illness cannot be fairly separated 
from its institutional context of late 20th century American education, and the collective 
anxieties over rights, merit, and competition in a knowledge based economy.  
This approach stands in contrast to an environmental explanation for the rise in 
ADHD, which would look for factors such as artificial food colorings, high fructuous 
corn syrup, or the prevalence of screens and personal electronics.  A radically 
constructivist account would argue that ADHD is mostly fictitious, a product of 
conspiracy between psychiatrists and the pharmaceutical industry with public collusion 
(Neven, Anderson, & Godber, 2002). While these explanations may have some salience, 
following changes in policy along with changes in diagnostic criterion shows ADHD has 
grown because it fits into a classificatory schema based on technocratic evaluations of 
ability and disability, rather than a moral classification of character. The legislative 
process decided that, as a matter of fundamental human rights, society could no longer 
infringe on the liberties people with disabilities. This required specific processes for 
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determining when someone was disabled, when their rights were infringed, and what 
accommodation was necessary to correct the infringement.  
This knot that refuses to be unraveled is the disability accommodation, a peculiar 
object at the heart of this section. I will explain how the disability accommodation links 
the individual to the population, by transforming the abstract political right to be included 
in the community into concrete practices and technologies. I will connect the ontology of 
the disability accommodation, what it actually is, to the legislative history of disability 
rights in the United States, and to the practice of recognizing and compensating for 
relevant biophysical differences in an educational setting. In the broadest theoretical 
sense, I put Foucault’s normative Biopolitics (1990), the use of regulations and 
knowledge/power to produce certain aspects of a population, in conversation with 
Dworkin’s liberal apologia for rights, and the ways in which an individual may demand 
recognition from a political community.  
This project centers on colleges for two reasons.  First, as objects of study, college 
students are nominal adults in charge of their own destiny, making decisions about 
specialization and future identity that go beyond universal primary and secondary 
schooling. College is a time when people decide who they want to be, choosing majors 
and careers, and grades, credit hours, and degrees, that are non-comparable on the 
specifics, but are generally transferrable within a college and across the college system 
nationally. Second, ADHD in children and elementary schools has already been written 
about (Rafalovich, 2007), and I am examining how ADHD acts as an instantiation of 
larger trends in the negotiation of political rights, and how it continues to exist in adults 
beyond an initial diagnosis. 
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 Colleges do not set accommodation policy independently. The practices of 
Disability Resource Centers (Chapter 3) are a logical extension of special education in 
primary and secondary schools, in order to minimize disruption for the student and ensure 
the best chance for success in a new and much less structured environment.  The 
existence of these programs, their rationales and some of their procedures, were created 
by a series of disability laws passed from the 1970s to the present, with their limits 
continuously refined by lawsuits and the internal evolution of bureaucratic standards. 
Accommodations cannot be understood except in context, and this section will describe 
that context, and the evolution of the accommodation as part of a system of categories, 
labels, and processes that circumscribe terms like disability, merit, fairness, justice, and 
flourishing. 
Caring About the Disabled  
American policy for people with disabilities traces its origins to a hospital for 
disabled sailors established in Boston in 1798 by President John Adams.  However, this 
was limited care for a small class of workers. Through the 19th century, care of the 
disabled was ad hoc, reliant on religious charitable institutions and a few schools, such as 
Gallaudet College for the Deaf and the Perkins School for the Blind. In the early 20th 
century, these programs were dramatically expanded in response to industrialization. 
Workplace safety and injury compensation legislation was prompted by the harsh 
conditions of railroad workers, one in eight of whom were killed or seriously maimed 
(Williams-Searle, 2001).  Progressive reformers, eager to avoid the patronage and 
corruption that characterized the post-Civil War Pension Bureau (Skocpol, 1995), created 
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a modern and rational system of disability pensions, based on medical evaluations and 
inability to garner future employment (Hickel, 2001). 
These systems recognized disability primarily as an injury than rendered an 
individual unable to work and support themselves and their family in an industrial 
economy. The fundamental injustice that random chance on a shop floor or battlefield 
might doom a man and his family to a life of penury and then starvation demanded 
charitable support from society, particularly if the disabled person had demonstrated their 
productive worth prior to the injury. However, as both workmen’s compensation 
programs and the First World War medical review boards found, resources were always 
less than sufficient to support all applicants and the majority of war injuries were for lung 
disease and cardiovascular conditions not obviously traceable to battlefield injuries. 
As a way to mitigate the possibility that disability compensation was creating 
dependency, rather than proper restitution for clearly identifiable harms, disability 
legislation came to center on the idea of vocational rehabilitation, programs designed to 
identify what jobs a disable person could hold, and guide them towards greater levels of 
self-sufficiency. Vocational rehabilitation was formalized by a national professional 
organization in 1913, and allied with Progressive Era programs for vocational schooling 
to link students to new industrial trades, and industrial psychiatry for the efficient 
management of the labor force (Scotch, 2001, p. 20). 
Vocational rehabilitation is a professional subtype of social work that grew out of 
Progressive era reforms. Elliot, writing an article on the future of the field in 1944, 
describes “its fundamental purpose [as] the conservation of human resources, and […] to 
assist persons who have suffered from accident, disease, or congenital disability to 
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establish themselves in full-time employment” (Elliot, 1944).  Employment is elevated to 
an almost spiritual status. For example, another review of the field from the late 1960s 
grounds the therapeutic value of work in a Freudian direction of interior energies, the 
common social good, and even the individual’s relationship with God (Di Michael, 
1969). Work, while central to vocational rehabilitation, is not its sole purpose. Both 
authors speak of it as a multidisciplinary applied program, combining aspects of 
physiology, psychology, labor advocacy, and social work, intimately related to finding 
out what each individual client can do, wants to do, and what is available in the vicinity. 
Occupational therapy has replaced vocational rehabilitation as the preferred term for 
these services; the process of individual assessment of quantitative physical and mental 
limits combined with qualitative assessment of inclinations and preferences, in order to 
customize and accommodate each client to a job site. 
 Funding for vocational rehabilitation programs increased from $1 million per year 
in 1920, matched on a 50-50 basis by each state and distributed according to population, 
to $300 million in 1965, with the federal government picking up the majority of a 75%-
25% share (Scotch, 2001, p. 22). In real terms, adjusted for inflation, this is an increase in 
program size approximately 120-fold. During this period, primary responsibility for 
vocational rehabilitation shifted from the Office for Education to the Federal Security 
Agency under the New Deal, and then to the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare under President Johnson’s reorganization.  As of the early 1970s, the financial 
responsibility for rehabilitating people with disabilities was primarily funded by the 
federal government but administered at a state level, and had grown significantly in scope 
without intense scrutiny over its regular reauthorization. 
34 
Section 504: The Disability Rights Paradigm 
  The 1960s and 1970s were a period of profound realignment in the relationship 
between the government and people, as exemplified by an expansive and newly 
empowered discourse of rights. The most prominent redefinition was the Civil Rights 
Movement, which fulfilled the promise of the 13th and 14th amendments, which achieved 
its victories through a combination of mass protests and Federal authority reaching down 
to dismantle racist state and local institutions via the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Second wave feminism achieved similar victories with Title IX prohibiting sex-
based discrimination in education.  These acts served as ready precedents for Federal 
legislation barring discrimination based on any condition, including disability.  
The activist culture of the era was represented in the New York-based Disabled in 
Action, and the Berkeley-based Center for Independent living. These groups organized 
by people with disabilities took as basic axioms that they were worthy of political 
inclusion. The first barrier to their well-being was the prejudiced to indifferent attitudes 
of government institutions, which refused to make even minor adjustments necessary to 
include their members (Shaprio, 1994). 
In this climate, the regular reauthorization of the Rehabilitation Act in 1972 
became an opportunity to expand the framework of civil rights to a government program 
that had previously been concerned with welfare and rehabilitation.  According to a 
Government Account Office report on vocational rehabilitation services, the bill’s 
sponsors intended to streamline various programs and expand access, but did not 
specifically intend to address civil rights.  As the bill neared completion, staffers were 
concerned that individuals who had completed rehabilitation would not be properly 
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integrated into society. An unknown person suggested that an anti-discrimination 
provision similar to the Civil Rights Act or Title IX would be a worthy addition to the 
bill. “Roy Millenson of Senator Javits’ staff had been involved in the development of the 
Education Amendments, and he ran out to his office and brought back language from 
Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act]. The language was adapted and inserted at the very end 
of the Rehabilitation Act. In the version of the bill that was ultimately enacted, that 
provision became Section 504” (Scotch, 2001, p.52). According to Scotch, Section 504 
was drafted by staffers without input from the disability activist community and passed 
both houses of Congress without significant debate. Though President Nixon refused to 
sign the bill, his objections were over the expense of the program, not any new legal 
rights that might be created. An amended bill, decreasing the funding allocated, was 
finally signed into law on September 26, 1973. During the writing and passage of the bill, 
Section 504 was largely an afterthought; the details of how the regulation would be 
promulgated and enforced would determine its power. 
 Section 504 states “No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United 
States, as defined in section 7(6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” (Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973). This portion of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act did not specify an agency 
responsible for determining when discrimination was occurring and redressing it, unlike 
the prior civil rights legislation that inspired the law.  Though the Department of 
Housing, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) continued to administer the rest of the law, it 
declined responsibility for Section 504, passing it off to the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) 
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in the Department of Justice (Scotch, 2001, p. 61).  The OCR was staffed by crusading 
lawyers with an absolutist attitude towards civil rights, rather than the consensus and 
program building bureaucrats who had previously administered rehabilitation programs.  
Over the next two years, lawyers from the OCR began drafting specific regulations for 
enforcing Section 504 in concert with disability rights activists. One major achievement 
was a redefinition of handicapped persons for the purposes of the act from those whose 
disability limited employment and could be remedied with rehabilitation to any person 
who “has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person’s life activities” (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 111a). More important was a 
spreading awareness that new civil rights for people with disabilities was immanent, and 
had been given to an agency that had a record of ignoring arguments from enforced 
parties based on expense or impracticality (Scotch, 2001, p. 70). 
 Through 1975 and 1976, there was growing dissension within the DHEW 
bureaucracy about the scope of Section 504. Secretary David Matthews disagreed with 
the OCR’s inclusion of alcoholic and drug addicts as impairments, seeing a hazard that 
they would take resources away from more deserving ‘traditionally handicapped’ people. 
Secretary Matthews slowed the implementation of Section 504 by requiring an outside 
cost/benefit analysis of Section 504, which eventually concluded an overall benefit of 
$300 million, with the major costs of expanding access to education offset by economic 
growth and reduced redundancy in delivery of services (Scotch, 2001, Appendix D). A 
contentious public commenting process and series of town hall meetings in August of 
1976 failed to produce decisive action on the bill, and Secretary Matthews delayed any 
decision until the Carter administration entered office. The new administration replaced 
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him with Secretary Joseph Califano. Califano decided that he and the new administration 
needed to review Section 504. The further delay angered disability rights activists who 
had become more organized, and well-informed of the scope of the act by the public 
comment period and informal contacts with the OCR (Scotch, 2001, p. 106). On April 4, 
1976, a nationwide coalition of disability rights activist groups, bridging regions and 
traditional sections of the disability rights movement (blind, deaf, disabled veterans, etc), 
began occupying DHEW offices.  Califano was publically conciliatory in statements, but 
privately regarded the sit-in protests as an insult (Scotch, 2001, p. 113). Protestors left the 
Washington DC DHEW headquarters after 28 hours, but in San Francisco a well-
supported group of disability rights activists, in alliance with the Black Panther Party, 
labor organizations, and the gay rights movement, occupied local DHEW offices for over 
three weeks (Schweik, 2013). Secretary Califano capitulated on April 28th, signing strong 
regulations that prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities. 
 Section 504 is important because it is the foundation of the rights-based approach 
to disabilities enshrined in the Americans with Disabilities Act. Yet, as the legislative 
history shows, it was created and passed without particular deliberation, or the explicit 
participation of a broadly based disability rights movement, which arose as a national 
entity during the rule-writing process. In particular, Section 504 was the first significant 
disability rights legislation to apply to institutions of higher education, and was passed in 
its strongest form despite significant opposition from the American Council on Education 
(Scotch, 2001, p. 123-126). After 1976, right-based disability programs disseminated 
rapidly through American higher education, assisted by training grants from the OCR and 
private foundations.  The absolute and radical character of rights based initiatives offered 
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a clear counterpart to bureaucratic concerns over cost of implementation and 
programmatic inertia, while leaving room for substantial diversity in implementation at 
institutional and individual levels. 
Accommodating Individual Equality in Education 
The second major change in legal status for people with disabilities was the 
enactment of the Equal Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), 
which was reauthorized as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990 
(IDEA), and further expanded in 1997 and 2004. The legislative history is one of 
continuity, and minor changes to further focus the law on educational improvement, and 
then bring it into compliance with No Child Left Behind (Blackwell & Rossetti 2014).  
The EAHCA was passed as a Congressional response to two lawsuits on behalf of 
disabled children against school districts, Mills v. Board of Education (1972) and PARC 
v. Penn (1972), which concerned disabled children who had been excluded from public 
education.  In Mills, parents of a group of African-American children in Washington DC, 
described how their children been denied admission to or necessary aid in public schools, 
in violation of local law.  The defense argued that necessary provisions for all disabled 
children would be too difficult and expensive to implement, without vastly increased 
funding or decreased services for the general student population.  
In a ruling that cited Brown v. Board of Education, the court found that access to 
state-provided education is a basic right that must be made available to all under the 
Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The court’s decision reiterated the school 
board’s responsibility to educate all students. It required them to conduct a census of 
children with disabilities who were not being educated, to create programs to provide a 
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free and suitable public education regardless of the degree or kind of a child’s disability, 
and establish provisions for disciplinary hearings and public notification of the changes to 
the African-American community. 
 Mills concerned an abeyance of government duties in violation of statue, but 
PARC concerned sections of the Pennsylvania law which transferred responsibility for 
children certified as “uneducable and untrainable” by a school psychologist from the 
school to the Department of Welfare, which had no educational obligations. The plaintiffs 
sued under a tripartite argument the process for denying admission to schools lacked due 
process of law, that assuming that mentally disabled children would not benefit from 
education did not meet a rational basis in fact under the Equal Protection clause of the 
14th Amendment, and the entire section of law violated a Pennsylvania State 
Constitutional requirement for universal public education.  The court accepted all of these 
claims without dispute, seeing the case as standing in firm constitutional ground. 
Testimony from four experts in public education reaffirmed the positive influences of 
education for even severely disabled students and reiterated a history of underfunded 
special education programs used to exclude disabled children at minimum cost to society, 
rather than to help them reach their potential.  
The final decision overturned Pennsylvania laws which previously allowed 
schools to exclude disabled students arbitrarily, replacing them with a rigorous hearing 
process before a special officer where parents were represented by counsel, cross-
examined school witnesses, and could introduce their own evidence. Pennsylvania was 
required to provide “access to a free public program of education and training appropriate 
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to his learning capabilities” to all students, either in public schools or by providing 
equivalent financial support for private or at-home education. 
 With 28 similar lawsuits working their way through courts, and state level school 
officials complaining that they did not have the resources to abide by likely judicial 
decisions, Congress resolved the issue by writing the recommendations of Mills and 
PARC into law (Coates, 1985). The bill opened by explaining its purpose as remedy the 
injustices faced by 8 million disabled students in the United States, four million of whom 
were underserved by the existing educational system, and one million excluded entirely, 
the EAHCA established the right of students to a ‘free and appropriate public education’ 
including specialized designed instruction and support services, at no additional cost to 
parents. The EAHCA established a system of grants to states to pay for increased 
services, starting at an additional 5% of the average cost to educate a pupil in 1978, to 
40% of the cost for 1982 onwards. The 40% above the average per-pupil costs remains in 
the current law (Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004). In 
2014 the total Federal expense of IDEA grants was $12.6 billion, out of a total 
Department of Education $71.2 billion, including $22.8 for Pell Grants (US Department 
of Education, 2014). 
The EAHCA enshrined the Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) as process by 
which the right to a free and appropriate education would be enacted. The IEP is a 
document pertaining to the unique circumstances of a disable student, which included a 
statement of educational goals, accommodations, and progress made, repeated on an 
annual basis by a committee consisting of the teacher, parents, student, and any relevant 
experts. If parents felt their rights were no being respected, they had the right to 
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arbitration by a non-educational party, with written testimony, cross-examination, and the 
ability to escalate to civil suits if an accord could not be reached (Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975). 
 While Congress intended to support education of children with disabilities, it did 
so without specifying which accommodations represented a substantive version of an 
‘appropriate education’ in the terminology of the law. In the 1982 case Hendrick Hudson 
District Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme Court determined that the EAHCA 
required schools to demonstrate that their efforts permitted the child to benefit 
educationally from that instruction and were in compliance with the procedures of the 
IEP (Coates, 1985). Procedural correctness became a proxy for the difficult business of 
determining the effectiveness of an IEP. Writing on legal best practices for IEPs, an 
article by Drasgow, Yell, and Robinson reiterates the importance of notifying parents of 
IEP hearings, make sure that appropriate experts are present along with administrators 
and general and special education teachers, and above all, following a program of 
evaluating the student’s disability, developing measurable educational goals, and clearly 
delineating responsibility for providing services (Drasgow, Yell, & Robinson, 2001).   
A current assessment of the IEP notes that while it is the cornerstone of special 
education in America, major difficulties remain: Even though the basic framework of the 
law is 40 years old, schools still have difficulty with the paperwork requirements, 
convening effective IEP team meetings, and ensuring that the results lead to the standards 
of educational achievement and inclusion of the IEP student within the general education 
curriculum and school activities. Observations of IEP meetings and surveys of parents 
indicate that teachers have a greater influence on IEP development conversations than 
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parents or students, using their technical authority to foreclose meaningful debate and 
active participation. The ability to use specialized terminology about learning disorders, 
and to compare the child at hand to similar cases and targets for normal progress, appears 
to carry more authority than the personal biases of parental love in determining what is 
best for the child (Blackwell & Rossetti, 2014).  
 The EAHCA recognizes that a right to inclusion was meaningless absent the 
ability to be included. EAHCA included mechanisms for a top level distribution of funds 
to remedy individual exclusion from the educational system, as well as indicating 
institutional best practices to ensure that children were not just granted the right to be 
educated, but also made meaningful progress towards adulthood regardless of their level 
of disability. The IEP offers a technique for normalizing difficult individuals to a general 
expectation of educational involvement, but this right to a free and appropriate public 
education, as filtered through the mechanisms of procedural correctness, is far from 
absolute. Studying Southern California schools, Ong-Dean noted a clear difference in 
approach towards IEPs and special education across class and race: a “high-road” used by 
primarily white upper-middle class professionals to gain access to additional resources, 
and “low-road” imposed on black and Hispanic lower-class parents by schools in order to 
control and discipline problem students away from the general population (Ong-Dean, 
2009).  
The EAHCA and IEP matter because they solidified the right to public education 
as a basic component of citizenship and the prelude to an economically, politically, and 
socially successful life. However, unlike the strict ‘civil rights’ status of Section 504, the 
EAHCA and its successors mandated a transfer of funds from the Federal government to 
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the states, along with a single national process for deciding when those rights had been 
met.  The EAHCA established that schools could not arbitrarily exclude students, had to 
take a census of students that had been previously excluded, and must provide 
individualized plans to ensure that each student garnered some educational benefit from 
education.  Though framed in the discourse of rights, the actual IEP is an expert-driven, 
scientific and legalistic procedure, based on diagnosis and assessment of difference, 
drawing up of goals and means to meet those goals, and constant measurement and 
adjustment throughout the student’s educational career. Though more inclusive of the 
disabled individual than previous models, the IEP is still biased towards the institution, as 
the count of participants shows: general education teacher, special education teacher, 
administrator, and relevant experts on the side of the school; parents and if the student is 
14 or older, the student, on the side of the child. The school defines what counts as 
expertise, observation, measurement, and progress. Though the IEP represents a gateway 
by which rights may be accessed from the state, in a manner properly defined and 
protected, passing through that gate requires buying into the terms and ideology of the 
educational system. 
Though colleges are not required to follow the IEP process, it is a standard 
practice in the field of higher education, which disabled students understand and if they 
are entering college will be followed in form by the Disability Resource Center. The 
DRC process involves fewer people and formally mandated confrontations of evidence. 
At Arizona State University, diagnosis, goals, and accommodations are negotiated 
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between the student and a DRC counselor on a semester-by-semester bases.3 As a model, 
the IEP provides a process wherein teachers can bring their concerns to parents in a 
procedurally defined setting without emotional or moral valences, and have those 
concerned addressed through the technical expertise of external committee members. An 
IEP relevant diagnosis, such as ADHD, is not a judgment passed on the child, but a 
means to translate the concerns of teachers--classroom disruption, and parents--future 
consequences for a lack of studiousness, into a course of action with positive results 
continually reaffirmed by measureable progress towards mutually agreed upon goals. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Running out of Rights 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) represented that last word in 
the expansion of civil rights for people with disabilities.  Building on prior legislation, 
including laws mandating accessible buildings, public housing, and voting, the ADA 
represented a comprehensive expansion of the rights of people with disabilities to all 
areas of life, including employment, private businesses, public transportation, and 
telecommunication networks. The ADA begins with a nine part statement of purpose, 
grouped into three thematic areas: First, people with disabilities have historically been 
excluded from American public life by social prejudice and infrastructural barriers; 
Second, it is appropriate for Congress to remediate this inequality of opportunity by 
creating a law against exclusionary standards; Third, this law will be of net benefit to 
society by reducing dependence (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). 
                                                 
3 From my time with the DRC, summer 2012. 
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Unlike Section 504 or the EAHCA, the legislative process behind the passage of 
the ADA was a deliberate and conscious expansion of disability rights through a broad-
based democratic process. The 1980s were a decade characterized by stasis and small 
reversals under the anti-regulation Reagan administration (Switzer, 2003, p.83).  As the 
disability rights legislation of the 1970s was implemented, it became apparent to an 
increasingly professional network of disability rights activists and regulators that a 
comprehensive solution was needed. The National Council on Disability, a small 
independent agency created by the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that created 
Section 504, drafted a report Towards Independence that used the language of President 
Reagan to argue for replacing the patchwork of disability laws with a single civil rights 
standard to provide equal opportunity (National Council on Disability, 1986, p.11). 
Towards Independence, and a follow on report On the Threshold of Independence, served 
as a first draft for a 1988 version of the ADA, that was stalled in committee by pressure 
from the Reagan White House. 
Despite this early setback, disability rights advocates persisted, building links 
between the leading advocacy groups Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund and 
the Consortium of Children with Disabilities, along with numerous smaller groups, on the 
basis that everybody would work together to advance the rights of people with disabilities 
as a united body and would reject any law that preferentially benefited or harmed specific 
groups. Coalitions were also formed with parents of children with disabilities and 
disabled veterans, groups that had mostly worked independently. Activists sought support 
from the extreme left and right, pairing with HIV positive activist groups at the height of 
the AIDS panic, and Right to Life groups concerned about the possibility of selective 
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abortion for pre-natal diagnosis of disability (Switzer, 2003, p.88). This broad coalition 
was helped by a “hidden army” of legislators whose lives had been touched by disability, 
including Vice President (and, later, President) George H.W. Bus. It also used a 
deliberately low-key strategy that avoided tense confrontation and enumeration of 
explicit costs to the bill (Switzer, 2003. Shapiro, 1994).  An amendment by Senator Hatch 
of Utah to provide a tax break to small businesses affected by the bill was voted down as 
an unnecessary complication.  The bill was opposed by a coalition of business and small 
government ideologues, but this group was too disorganized to counter the effective 
framing of the law as a proper allocation of rights to the most deserving of excluded 
groups. The Americans with Disabilities Act was passed by strong majorities in both the 
House and Senate and signed into law on July 26, 1990. 
The general rule of the ADA was that “no covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual with a disability” (Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990), either in employment or access to public accommodations, including many 
businesses. Discrimination was broadly defined, including explicit or de facto segregation 
and limits to opportunity, status, or enjoyment of services.  Not providing “reasonable 
accommodations” was also determined to be segregation. The precise limits of 
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” was left unspecified by the ADA, 
leaving the Supreme Court to substantially clarify and narrow the definitions of 
reasonable and hardship. The ADA also defined disability as broadly as possible, as “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; or a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having 
such an impairment.” This broad definition excluded several standard categories of the 
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‘undeserving’, such as drug addicts and sexual deviants, who were explicitly banned from 
using the provisions of the ADA to seek redress for their problems. 
The ADA did not precisely define what a covered disability was, or mandate a 
specific hearing process for forming accommodations. Rather, it gave every private 
individual the right to apply to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for 
redress, and to sue for civil damages of up to $40,000 if they believed that they had been 
discriminated against in employment. In practice, this suit required a three-part process of 
proving that the plaintiff had a disability, could perform the job they sought, and were 
excluded from the job because of their disability (Mayerson & Mayer, n.d). A trio of 
cases brought before the Supreme Court in 1999 turned on the question of whether a 
disability that had been medically corrected could still be regarded as a disability and 
protected under law.  Sutton v. United Airlines concerned sisters who were pilots with 
poor vision (20/200 uncorrected, 20/20 corrected) and who were denied an interview with 
United Airlines on the basis of their poor uncorrected eyesight. In the opinion for the 
court, Justice O’Conner wrote: “The use of a corrective device does not, by itself, relieve 
one’s disability. Rather, one has a disability under subsection A if, notwithstanding the 
use of a corrective device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity” 
(O’Conner, 1999). Arguing that with corrected vision, the petitioners were not disabled 
under the ADA, but that United Airlines was still justified in refusing to hire them, she 
continued: “By its terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes 
over others and to establish physical criteria. An employer runs afoul of the ADA when it 
makes an employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or 
imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity… [I]t is free to 
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decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals 
less than ideally suited for a job” (O’Conner, 1999)..  Murphy v. United Parcel Service 
and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg followed the Sutton reasoning; in cases concerning a 
postal worker with hazardously high blood pressure and a truck driver with monocular 
vision respectively, the court found that impairments were significant enough to serve as 
ground for dismissal, but not disabling enough to qualify the plaintiffs for protection 
under the ADA.   
This obscurity of application has bedeviled the ADA to a greater extent than 
Section 504 and EAHCA and successors. As a flagship piece of legislation, the ADA is 
applicable to many more areas of public life.  What was intended as a clear issue of 
justice instead has become a complicated legalistic slicing of applicability and 
definitions. While some major areas of accommodation were well addressed, such as 
wheelchair accessibility, the ideal that a person with a disability has an inherent worth 
that cannot be infringed by circumstances runs up against the ability of employers to 
define the limits and duties of a relevant job and select candidates on the basis of ability. 
The principle that everyone is accorded equal rights by society runs up against the 
practical limits that recognition of these rights requires political and economic labor and a 
rebalancing of responsibility that existing sources of power find bedeviling. 
The fear that the ADA would unduly burden small businesses by forcing them to 
rebuild expensive accommodations for all their customers and employees has not been 
born out. Although there have been isolated examples of lawyers using disabled clients to 
find non-compliant businesses and extract fees, as in Robert McCarthy, a ‘professional 
litigant’ who has filed hundreds of ADA suits over 14 years (Stapley, 2015), more than 
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75% of ADA claims are decided against the disabled party (Colker, 2002). In real terms, 
the 25 years since enactment of the ADA have not seen demonstrable rises in the quality 
of life for people with disability; they are still poorer and suffer from worse health 
outcomes than the population at large. The ADA has attracted critics from within the 
disability services field. For example, two professors of social work argue that it further 
isolates people with disabilities within a protected class rather than appropriate 
mainstreaming them, protects shirkers under fraudulent disabilities, and trivializes real 
disabilities (Karger & Rose, 2010). This assessment is a matter of opinion, rather than 
hard evidence, but demonstrates the difficulty in matching ideals of inclusion to 
legislative means and life outcomes. 
Conclusion: Between Rights and Biopolitics 
The three laws that I have discussed in this chapter concern the evolution of the 
legal inclusion of people with disabilities in society from 1973 onwards, and about the 
appropriate form of recourse if someone is not included. This language takes the form of 
a rights discourse, because rights are the philosophical form by which American law in 
the late 20th and early 21st century justifies its existence as properly articulating natural 
rights, but that in practice these laws are enacted in a mode of biopolitics, about the 
management of the population as productive organisms rather than self-governing 
citizens.  
America is a nation founded on rights; with the beautiful poetry of the Declaration 
of Independence grounding the sovereignty of the new nation in the self-evident truth that 
all men are created equal, and all have the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. The Constitution sketched out a balance of powers between the three branches 
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of government, and the Federal government and the states. The Bill of Rights sharply 
limited the power of the Federal government to infringe on individual liberties. This 
original basis of rights, grounded in the theories of Locke and Rousseau, was to protect 
the inherent dignities of man against the overbearing and arbitrary exercise of political 
power.  Rights originate from a source prior to any specific legal enactment: the specific 
proposals of the Bill of Rights were a development and enactment of the innate and self-
evident truths proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence. This independent quality 
distinguishes rights from laws, which under the theory of legal positivism owe their 
legitimacy to a pedigree: enacted by Congress, proclaimed by the king, signed by the 
President, assented to by an assembly of townsfolk.  Dworkin defines rights as a kind of 
political trump-card, used by an individual to counter a demand that in the name of the 
public good, they be prohibited doing what they wish, or for having some loss or injury 
imposed upon them (Dworkin, 1978, p. xi). 
The area encompassed by rights has expanded since the early days of the 
Republic. The original Bill of Rights protected against explicit government intrusion in a 
variety of key areas, but this single dimension of protection against explicit actions was 
insufficient to guarantee the exercise of rights in practice. The 14th Amendment 
recognized that rights could be infringed by unequal application of law, by arbitrary 
process, and that rights beyond those enumerated in the Bill of Rights existed and could 
be recognized and protected by law. Dworkin defines the most basic right as the right of 
concern: that human beings are entitled to a minimum of respect, and that this amount of 
respect should be equal regardless of social standing (Dworkin, 1978, p. 185-222). 
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America laws are typically written using a discourse of rights, but they are 
enforced and enacted in a framework of biopolitics, particularly when the matter at hand 
concerns the life course and biological categorization of citizens.  The language of 
Section 504, the most simply defined and rights oriented of the laws discussed, still 
limited its scope to disabled individuals denied employment and who could be reasonably 
be expected to benefit from rehabilitative services. Subsequent laws, developed in light of 
experience with Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, more precisely defined the 
process by which eligibility under the law would be obtained; creating the sub-
populations that are the targets of biopolitical exercises in growth. 
As part of his archeological project on the state, Foucault distinguishes a shift 
from ancient sovereign power to modern regulatory power. The ancient state was defined 
by its power to seize through violence; a sword-wielding sovereign that could levy fines, 
recruit armies, and kill in necessary self-defense. Sovereign power was a historical fact 
based in command of arms, and a juridicial theory justified by the existence of more 
rapacious sovereigns beyond the borders. In Foucault’s reading of Hobbes, polities 
designated a sovereign to protect their lives, granting their own rights to death to a 
common power. Life existed outside of power and politics, but was the foundation upon 
which political theory was debated (Foucault, 1976, p.63). 
The governing innovations that lead to modernity, and indeed government itself in 
the second half of the 18th century, was a new form of power based on the ability to 
organize, regulate, optimize, and generate. The power to kill was replaced by the power 
to foster life, or conversely disallow to the point of extinction, pathological forms of life. 
The sovereign’s sword, while not eliminated, was encrusted with a layer of norms, 
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institutions, and techniques of knowledge, which worked on the twin poles of the new 
government. The first of these poles was the anatomo-politics of the human body, 
“centering on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, 
the extortion of its force” (Foucault, 1990, p. 139). The second pole was the biopolitics of 
the population, the regulation of the entire population according to statistical measures to 
ensure the proper levels of births, deaths, disease mortality. The existence of Man as a 
species beyond the existence of any individual man. 
 Biopolitics creates an inversion of the traditional relationships of statecraft, life, 
and death. Whereas under the old order, life was that residue left over by the exercise of 
sovereignty, in the modern order “life itself” is the center of a political terrain described 
by a boundary of death (Esposito, 2013). Much subsequent scholarship in biopolitics has 
focused on singularities; circumstances where the intertwining of politics, life, and death 
become most apparent.  This can be found in Agamben’s (1989a) linkage of liberal 
democracy and mid-20th century totalitarian states, through their common obsession with 
zoē—bare, anonymous, natural, animal life. Human beings are treated as bodies with 
natural rights, rather than as citizens with political rights. Liberal democracies try to 
transform this bare life into political life; totalitarian regimes attempt to purify the 
national body through the death camp. Both rely on the same understanding of the 
politics of life and death.  Similar examples in the literature include various states of 
exemption; death camps, colonial regimes, famines induced by market forces (Montag, 
2005). These states of exemption are illuminating cases of the ultimate limits and logics 
of biopolitics, but not particularly relevant to the experiences of the American middle 
class, nor indeed the vast majority of people who live in well-ordered states rather than 
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states of exemption. Rather, through the creation of new rights defined in terms of 
medical/economic disabilities, the state normalizes a form of citizenship in which citizens 
may participate only by first demarcating their biological difference. 
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Law Definition of Disability Legal Remedy or Correction Vocation Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Section 504 
7(6) The term "handicapped individual" means any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and  (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability fromvocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to titles I and I II of this Act 
No handicapped individual may be excluded from or discriminated against by the Federal government, or an entity which receives Federal funds. Regulations written and enforced by the Office of Civil Rights in Department of Justice 
Equal Access to Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
in paragraph (1) thereof, by striking out "crippled" and inserting in lieu thereof "orthopedically impaired", and by inserting immediately after "impaired children" the following: ", or children with specific learning disabilities," 
Access to a “free and appropriate public education” through the Individualized Educational Plan, census of underserved handicapped students, and legal requirements that State abide by this act or lose funding.  IEP process mandates special resources as decided by a committee of experts, with proper notification and appeal, including modified instruction, assignments, transportation, and assistance. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990 
"(1) The term 'children with disabilities' means children— "(A) with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and "(B) who, by reason thereof need special education and related services." 
As above, with greater funding for assistive technology devices and research into special education best practices and assessment. Regulations maintained by Department of Education 
Americans with Disability Act 1990 
(2) Disability The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual ‐ (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.  
Employers may not discriminate in hiring, and must provide “reasonable accommodations”  to allow disabled workers to continue in their job.  EEOC manages complaints for workplaces. If this fails, employees can sue for up to $40,000 in damages. Similar provisions cover public transit and private businesses.  Americans with Disabilities Act 2008 
(1) Disability The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—   (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;   (B) a record of such an impairment; or   (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)). (2) Major life activities   (A) In general For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,  talking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.   (B) Major bodily functions For purposes of paragraph (1), a major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. (3) Regarded as having such an impairment For purposes of paragraph (1)(C):   (A) An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity. 
Expansion of definition of disability following narrowing of definition in Supreme Court cases. 
 Table 1: Comparison of Definitions of Disability and Legal Remedies 
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3. ACCOMMODATIONS IN EDUCATION 
 The previous chapter discussed the creation and management of disabilities  
through the lens of discrete rights and the biopolitical management of population as 
delineated by federal laws and policy-making in the Department of Education.  The next 
chapter will discuss the perceptions and ethical reasoning of college students on the 
frequency and use of stimulant medication to study.  Between these two subjects, the 
broadest federal policies and the daily lives of students, there exist the institutional 
structures and reasoning of colleges themselves. Colleges serve many purposes: the 
production of different kinds of credible knowledge, from experimental verification to 
humanistic exploration, the intellectual discovery of scholars, and most relevant to this 
section, the development of students for the rest of their lives, both as individuals and as a 
continually changing cohort of future leaders and professionals. 
Universities have many missions under the umbrella of higher education.  To cite 
an example at hand:  
ASU is a comprehensive public research university, measured not by 
whom it excludes, but by whom it includes and how they succeed; 
advancing research and discovery of public value; and assuming 
fundamental responsibility for the economic, social, cultural and overall 
health of the communities it serves (ASU Charter, 2015). 
 Inclusion, the pursuit of knowledge, the well-being of all aspects of the student body and 
the communities to which they belong, are all indicated as objectives. Beyond 
perpetuating themselves, universities have a mission of perpetuating and improving the 
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societies that support them.  In the previous chapter, I described the biopolitical processes 
of sorting and categorizing populations which undergird modern forms of government.   
Universities have a unique finishing role in the biopolitical mode, serving as a 
place to specialize and order students, by major, by grade point average, by participation 
in extracurricular associations and activities. Compared to the progression through 
primary and secondary education, which in America is universally accessible and 
standardized at the state and Federal level, this process is primarily self-directed by 
individual students.  Once a student has made it past the initial gatekeepers at the 
admissions office, their choice of majors and classes is entirely their own. Even more 
freedom is provided by the curricular structure of electives used by most colleges, rather 
than a mandated core (Bastedo, 2011). A student’s success, in college and afterwards, is 
seem as determined by their own effort, wisdom, and innate talent. 
Access is a necessary component of fairness, the basic first step that 
accommodations at the Disability Rights Center (DRC) are designed to produce, but 
access as a value is also antithetical to competitive meritocracies.  At some point, success 
at earlier stages of education is required to benefit from the later stages; the curriculum is 
cumulative.  For the competition to be meaningful, it must be between equally matched 
competitors.  Opening up the university has been one a major goal of university 
admissions policy since World War II and the G.I Bill, which allowed millions of 
veterans to attend college when it would have previously been out of reach, financially 
and socially. Contemporary policy around diversity and the cost of college is conscious 
choice about a social need for access to higher education to be potentially available to all, 
and not a reproduction of the current elite (Crow & Dabars, 2015).  
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 The section that follows will look at what the implementation of disability 
accommodations actually entails, and how accommodating ADHD fits into educational 
frameworks that I describe as liberal and neoliberal.  The principles of liberal education 
as expert-guided self-discovery were laid out by philosopher John Dewey and included 
the scientific evaluation of students to match their strengths, weaknesses, and interests 
with the lesson plan. Neoliberal education furthers that individual bent, while increasing 
the stress laid on competition and efficiency. ADHD becomes a way to claim liberal 
rights to be included and a way to relieve some of the systemic pressures of 
neoliberalism. 
Making Accommodations 
The previous chapter discussed the legal foundations of disability rights.  This 
section goes into the work of enacting disability rights through the services of the ASU 
Disability Resource Center (DRC), where I did fieldwork in the summer of 2011. This 
was not the optimal time to observe how the DRC worked, as the campus is a veritable 
ghost-town due to students being on summer break, and confidentiality prevented me 
from observing the few interactions with students that did occur. I was able to glean some 
insights from interviews with the staff, and the physical equipment on hand. 
The phrase “level playing field” is key to understanding the DRC. Every single 
one of the employees at the DRC who I discussed my research with in my fieldwork there 
used that exact phrase to describe the purpose and goal of their work.  Implicit was the 
idea that the playing field was not really level, and that the competitive tasks of higher 
education selected against students for reasons that were essentially arbitrary.  
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 At some levels, this is trivial. The design of a building may make it impossible 
for a student in a wheelchair to get to a lecture hall or use a lab bench, when they are 
perfectly capable of doing the relevant tasks. But as services extend from physical 
disabilities to sensory and intellectual disabilities, the philosophy of the “level playing 
field” becomes increasingly abstracted. Services provided by the DRC include note 
takers, possibly freeing a student from paying attention during lecture, although they do 
need to be physically present or medically excused to receive their notes.  The most 
common DRC accommodation involves testing; in a quiet and more ergonomic room, or 
with additional time on the test. DRC staff reiterated that their work “does not alter the 
fundamental nature of the classroom or an assessment.” Given that competition in 
distracting environments or under severe time pressure are not considered core skills in 
higher education, these accommodations do not seem unduly beneficial.  
Aside from testing accommodations, the most visible DRC services create access 
through technology.  A busy room of undergraduate employees is on hand to scan and 
convert textbooks for speak-to-text readers for visually impaired students. For those with 
the right keywords, the DRC is a veritable toyshop. The centerpiece of a tour of the DRC, 
which I went on as an IGERT fellow and again during the summer, is the computer lab 
filled with new Mac and Windows PCs, all loaded with specialized software to enable 
students with disabilities to highlight papers in many different colors, dictate papers 
rather than type them, or zoom-and-enhance on large screens.  A second infrastructural 
access is the DRC cart program, which can with a doctor’s note and a phone call whisks 
students between dozens of drop-off points on a customized shuttle to match classes. 
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Walking a mile between classrooms in a passing period represents an undue burden to 
some students with mobility impairments. 
DRC counselors schedule meetings each semester with their clients, to ensure that 
their accommodations are up to date, that they have the resources necessary to succeed, 
and that they have an individualized plan for each of their classes. While the IEP 
(Individualized Educational Plan) is not legally mandated for DRC counselors, and the 
key bureaucratic features of a meeting involving educators, specialists, parents, and the 
student is absent, the basic logic of the IEP is carried through. 
“We are not diagnosticians” was a statement emphasized by DRC counselors, 
second only to “level playing field.” Counselors left determination of the exact nature of 
a student’s disability to the student’s medical team.  This division of responsibility struck 
me as odd at first.  Shouldn’t there be continuity between deciding what is wrong with a 
person, and what might help them succeed? In my own research, this break in 
responsibility was the gap by which stimulant medication entered campuses. However, in 
the broader field of managing disabilities in higher education, it is necessary.  Medical 
gatekeepers are interested in an accurate description of their patient and have no relation 
to an educational mission. DRC counselors must treat the individual in front of them as a 
‘case’, as an exemplar of a predefined problem found in many people, which, via the 
legal mechanisms of Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, has become a 
protected class. They can adjust the means by which they treat the case, but they cannot 
adjust the case itself. 
As long as the paperwork is properly filed, using terms defined in medicine but 
acted upon by social workers, then the institution’s duty to its students to ensure fairness 
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among the student body is met.  Splitting up the biological case, the legal 
accommodations, and education merit among doctor, DRC counselor, and professor, is an 
institutional division of responsibility that ensures that ultimately, the student is 
responsible for his or her own care and success.  As the unitary body in this arrangement, 
they are the only place where responsibility cannot be passed off to someone else. 
 But I was never able to receive a satisfactory answer to the question, “How do 
you know when the playing field is level?”  Given that students working with the DRC 
should be able to achieve the full range of grades, it is difficult to untangle how much of 
a success or failure is due to internal factors under the student’s control, such as study 
habits and mastery of the material, which are the proper foci of competition and merit, 
and how much is due to the external assistance of the DRC.  Understanding the full 
meaning of the level playing field and the work of the DRC requires thinking about two 
sets of values in education. 
Liberal Values in Education 
The development of education values in 20th century American education can be 
made legible through the work of its primary philosopher, John Dewey.  Dewey 
developed a theory of education that linked the moral development of the individual to 
his or her future civic participation via a progressive, i.e. scientifically designed and 
continually improving, curriculum. Dewey’s theories rejected the prevailing wisdom of 
assign-study-recite and a strictly structured classroom in favor of creating an environment 
where the student could follow their own preferences and interests, with the teacher 
ideally serving as a guide and facilitator of learning, rather than an instrument of 
discipline and conformity. Universal education in this manner is fundamental to 
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democracy, as only an educated and morally developed population is capable of 
governing itself. Scientific teaching serves to individually guide students towards 
flourishing and self-fulfillment, through a process that aligns student interests with the 
proper materials and experiences in an ecosystem of learning. Teachers are therefore 
friendly but disinterested professionals, supporting the development of all the skills 
necessary for modern society, particularly “learning to learn”, while also ensuring a basic 
level of moral development (Archambault, 1964).  
 Dewey conceives of education as a process [his emphasis], which starts with each 
individual student as they are, with their predispositions in attitude, ability, and existing 
knowledge, but which must involve the guided development “towards more effective 
techniques, towards greater self-reliance, towards a more thoughtful and inquiring 
disposition, one more capable of persistent effort in meeting obstacles” [emphasis mine] 
(Dewey, 1934).  The process is horizon-like. An end-state that might be deemed 
“educated” is not the student as graduate, finished product of an educational factory, but 
the continual learning of new skills and knowledge. Science, as conceived of by Dewey, 
was both the model and central content of learning. The structure of “observation, 
inquiry, reflection, and testing that are the heart of scientific intelligence” (Dewey, 1938) 
is both how students are supposed to be educated, and what they are being educated to 
achieve.  In an era that Dewey calls out as being disrupted in every aspect by scientific 
and technological changes, only scientific modes of thought can enable learners to link 
values to conditions, causes, and facts. Constant testing and improvement of curriculum 
and assessments from rational first principles, rather than holding to tradition, assures 
relevance of education under systems of change. 
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If scientific understanding was the epistemic backbone of Deweyian, progressive 
education, the direction of impulses and emotions into rational expression of the self is its 
ethical core.  “Both desire and effort are phases of self-expression arising whenever it 
becomes so complex that the ends, the self to be expressed, and the powers at hand, the 
means of expression, do not directly coincide with one another” (Dewey, 1896). Ideally, 
a student is fully engaged in the task at hand, but most classroom experiences teach the 
level of inattention that can be maintained while still passing the test. This inattention is 
the gap through which errors which prevent a learner from achieving lifelong self-
fulfillment propagate. 
Education must be prosocial, guiding students towards a better sense of how they 
might contribute to their communities and the sum total of humanity. Hands-on learning 
was necessary to bridge the tensions of Dewey’s rapidly industrializing middle-class 
America, where traditional divides between the laboring and aristocratic classes no longer 
applied.  All students needed both hands-on experience to learn how the new things of the 
world worked, and the reflective and expressive space of the liberal arts education 
traditionally reserved for the elite.  “When the school introduces and trains each child of 
society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of 
service, and providing him with instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the 
deepest and best guaranty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious” 
(Dewey, 1899). The Deweyian ideal translates the virtuous republic dreamed of by the 
Founding Fathers into an actionable plan, translatable across the continent and capable of 
being administered by a cadre of scientific professionals, their civic calling allied with 
specialized and ever-improving knowledge.  
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Dewey’s concerns with attention, desire, and effort closely match George Still’s 
1902 description of a proto-ADHD as a deficit of moral will. Without the ability to 
control base animal pleasures, balance the wants of the individual against the good of the 
group, and consistently hold to a ‘scientific’ cycle of observation and analysis, a learner 
could not benefit from education or achieve true flourishing. Against this, the scientific, 
optimistic, and progressive ethos of Dewey’s vision of education argued that any student 
could be helped. An alliance between teachers in classrooms and scientific and medical 
experts could meet any individual where he or she was, and guide him or her into full 
civic participation no matter how profoundly disabled; at first in specialized hospital-
schools, then included in mainstream education after the accomplishments of the 
disabilities rights movement discussed in the previous chapter. The premise that 
education was the door that opened to civic participation, not merely employment or 
skills, serves as one of the strongest rights-based arguments for inclusive and effective 
education.  
Neoliberal Values in Education 
Of course, as anyone who spent time in an American classroom can testify, 
Dewey’s programs are implemented more in the breach than in practice. It is difficult to 
think of a period in the 20th century when education has not been in crisis. Whether it is 
poverty in isolated rural areas or dangerous urban jungles, successive waves of 
immigrants who surely this time will never adapt to American culture, constant calls for 
more accountability and better education development, or the twin demons of waste and 
underfunding, education is a perennial target for reform. Reform can be bent to numerous 
purposes. Deweyian reform envisioned a joint project of person building and community 
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building, with the self-governing flourishing adult as the elemental unit of democracy.  
Scientifically trained professionals were necessary to help those adults craft themselves, 
and the benefits of such professional aid were to be distributed as widely as possible. 
The pattern of reform that came to dominate was neoliberal reform, focused on 
efficiency, the needs of the workforce, and above all capitalization of education—the 
modeling of education as an investment with future individual and collective returns.  
The accusation of “neoliberalism” is a chimera, potentially doing whatever derogatory 
work an author needs doing, from criticizing the trade policies of the International 
Monetary Fund to the dismantling of labor regulations in Wisconsin.  Recognizing the 
polyvalent nature of the term, and trying to avoid a simply derogatory use, I see it as a 
mode of assessment and reasoning that borrows the vocabulary of liberal democracy, but 
makes a key and subtle redefinition away from the intangible work of building political 
communities, and towards the values of transparency and transferability in the name of 
capital enhancement. 
Wendy Brown, in one of the more clear books of critique on the topic, casts the 
growth of neoliberalism as the replacement of Homo politicus with Homo oeconomicus. 
Homo politicus is the self-governing man imagined by Aristotle; a member of a 
community and participant in civic action (Agamben, 1998b).  Contemporary Homo 
oeconomicus goes beyond the perfectly rational merchant of microeconomics to an 
entrepreneurial reshaping of human beings as “financialized human capital: its project is 
to self-invest in ways that enhance its value or to attract investors through constant 
attention to its actual or figurative credit rating and to do this across every sphere of its 
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existence.” (Brown, 2015, p. 31) The rationality of neoliberalism takes the possibilities of 
the human conditions and casts it through the lens of profitability. 
The regime of neoliberal rationality is pervasive, so saturating that seeing it at all 
requires a kind of intellectual slap in the face. Discussing Barack Obama’s 2011 State of 
the Union Address, and the President’s commitment to job growth as the guiding star of 
his administration, Brown writes: 
Attracting investors and developing an adequately remunerated skilled 
workforce--these are the goals of the world's oldest democracy led by a 
justice-minded president in the twenty-first century... Striking in its own 
right, this formulation means that democratic state commitments to 
equality, liberty, inclusion, and constitutionalism are now subordinate to 
the project of economic growth, capital positioning, and capital 
enhancement. These political commitments can no longer stand on their 
own legs, and the speech implies, would be jettisoned if found to abate, 
rather than abet, economic growth. (Brown, 2015, p.25)  
Competition is the basis of the neoliberal ethos.  Rather than continued task of 
individual self-fulfillment and collective governance, neoliberalism takes the Darwinian 
principle “of survival of the fittest” as its guiding ethos.  That which demonstrates 
survival value continues to exist. Society, such as it is, is the substrate on which evolution 
occurs.  Managing competitiveness, and particularly the rate of competition, is the 
throttle of neoliberal policy-making.  While the neoliberal ethos suggests that the highest 
rate of competition is the best, in order to create the most economic disruption, and the 
strongest surviving firms. However, existing companies and individuals in positions of 
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strength will also use their power as a defense, slowing down rates of competition in 
areas that threaten them.  Premising all human economic activity, the only type of activity 
that matters under neoliberalism, as based on skills which are learned at in formal 
educational institutions, some key features of neoliberal education become apparent. 
The education system is the first grid where the competitive potential of human 
capital can be measured.  It’s funding is to be economized and offset on students through 
loans, and the promise that a degree will lead to better career prospects. The proliferation 
of credentials and new degree types becomes a way to pre-differentiate a labor market, 
while funding the educational system itself by extracting surplus value from the human 
capital passing through it.  Economizing measures and competition within the education 
system create a ruthless pressure to eliminate reflective and truly difficult education 
experiences, in favor of those appropriately calibrated to the projected career trajectories 
of the individual student. If a discipline or subject is not immediately applicable to 
earning a better wage, then Darwinian pressures will sacrifice that subject for something 
that is more immediately marketable; say Communications instead of English, or 
Innovation instead of Science and Technology Studies (Brown, 2015, p. 175-200).  
In education, the analogies between the liberal modes of Dewey and the 
neoliberal modes described by Brown are close enough that the shift can be accomplished 
almost without noticing.  Flourishing becomes long-term viability; appreciation for labor 
and leisure becomes work-life balance; hands on learning, applied skill training; self-
knowledge is replaced by strategic planning. Whereas individual assessment in a liberal 
paradigm is one stage in lifelong education, in a neoliberal framework it becomes a sieve 
to categorize ever more finely the precise skills and abilities of an individual human 
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capital for potential inclusion in a portfolio of employees.  Scientific validation of 
techniques can be used to trim inefficiencies and standardizes the measures of skill across 
a global economy. 
The goals of a neoliberal educational system ensure that students properly 
internalize competitive values. They must understand that they are in charge of their own 
destinies, and that they should balance their energies and efforts towards strategic goals.  
It is to assign as clearly as possible a value to the educational experience, so that 
graduates can be incorporated into portfolios of human capitals, or more mundanely, be 
hired in a good job.  And because each educational institution is in competition for 
customer-students, they must demonstrate return on investment while minimizing their 
own capital costs.   There are some advantages to neoliberal education: it is more 
flexible, more customizable to individual needs and abilities, less tradition-bound; it is 
merely inimical to building self-governing, democratic political communities.  
From Liberalism to Neoliberalism 
There are more similarities than differences between liberal and neoliberal 
educational practices. Credit is earned by work done, and the same standards of 
evaluation apply to everybody.  If it were clear that some students were earning ‘A’s 
simply because of who they were, rather than because of what they had done in the class, 
then the instructors would be biased, and the credit not worth much.  The converse, lower 
grades given on the basis of racial or gender prejudice, may even be legally actionable. 
Second, there is the assumption that the work is worthwhile; that the assigned readings 
and tasks build to a worthwhile understanding of the world, or some specialized area of 
expertise, or of the student themselves. If the work is not worthwhile, than the class is a 
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rip-off for the student, or degenerates into rote punishment for failure to jump through 
arbitrary hoops, a process which may be fair but is ultimately empty.  Competition arises 
from the combination of fairness and merit, competition is the means by which 
excellence is achieved, even in the absence of formally understood measures of 
accomplishment.  By pitting a group against each other in the same task, on an level 
playing field, it’s possible to determine which of them are most meritorious.  Competition 
can also, in an area of limited resources, be useful to separate out those who will go on to 
the next stage. The difference is in ends, not means.  Liberal education aims to produce 
citizens to join political communities.  Neoliberal education produces human capitals that 
are acquired by portfolios. 
For liberalism and its Homo politicus, fairness and access means that no one is 
denied rights, particularly the fundamental right of participation (Dworkin, 1978). 
Education becomes a means to ensure progression from the minimal political rights of the 
child to the complete political rights of the adult citizen. Under theories of justice, 
progression to full political citizenship should be as accessible as possible; otherwise the 
democratic potential of the society is undermined.  Competition is a means of inducing 
striving towards self-flourishing, with the external recognition of merit a means of 
encouraging internal love of excellent and lifelong education. Though all these values are 
held in tension, it is access and fairness which dominate in liberal educational systems.  
Accommodating ADHD is just one small way that all people are allowed to obtain the 
status of fully educated citizens, by helping their teachers adjust scientifically to best 
guide their students.   
 The full details of the shift from liberal to neoliberal domains in education are 
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outside of the scope of this chapter.  Some reasonable indicators of the move are the 
accountability and charter school movement at the state level, designed to increase 
transparency and competition between K-12 schools so that parents have the freedom, if 
they can pay the costs in time and money, to send their children to schools sharpened by 
competition.  In higher education, the rise of for-profit colleges and the casualization of 
the professoriat, the replacement of tenure-track faculty with poorly paid adjuncts who 
have neither the spare time nor moral authority to act as models for their students, is one 
immediate sign of the change (Bosquet, 2008). Liberalism is a fragile thing, a utopian 
dream that is aspired too but rarely reached. Neoliberalism is much more comfortable 
climbing the steps of Maslow’s pyramid, using “shocks” to remind its captives that the 
basic infrastructure that sustains their secure existence can always be destroyed in service 
of someone else’s profit, while leaving the glittering heights of status visible to those 
with the ambition to strive for them (Klein, 2008). 
Most people today spend more time thinking in the style of neoliberalism than 
liberalism. As the next chapter will discuss in depth, students do not regard taking 
stimulant medication to study as morally wrong, since studying is proper behavior, and 
things that help a student study are acceptable. The divide between medicine and drugs, a 
professional divide characterized by medical authorization rather than actual molecular 
differences, is clear in students’ statements.  If the use of stimulant medication has been 
authorized by a doctor it is not wrong, while taking the very same substance for its 
pleasurable psychoactive effects would be (DeSantis & Hane, 2010). 
Those in a position of responsibility, who might sound an alert about moral crisis, 
the Dean of Students-type campus administrator, have much more pressing concerns.  
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The moral development of students in the university is an artifact left over from the 
liberal era of education, and the idea of in loco parentis. Modern administrators have a 
circumscribed role, and more pressings concerns about issues that actually directly injure 
students. In doing this research, I have informally asked university administrators their 
concerns or experiences with this issue.  The only one who had a concern was an 
administrator with two psychiatrists reporting to him, who explained that many students 
had requested prescriptions for Ritalin and Adderall, and they believed that this was 
contributed to abuse, and would no longer fill them.  Student complaints about this policy 
escalated to the level of the college president, where it was decided that the psychiatrists 
were in the right, professionally and legally. As my informant said, “This was not a 
treatment program. It was a need to compete. They needed these drugs to compete within 
a culture of competition” (Personal Correspondence, 2015). However, there were no 
restrictions put in place on students who see a psychiatrist off-campus or who went 
through the entire DRC process there.  
When I followed up with a question about what he thought was a problem on 
campus, he placed binge drinking and novel hallucinogens as the highest priority. 
Alcohol is implicated in student deaths, either by poisoning or misadventure, trips to the 
hospital, sexual assault, and a host of real and immediate harms.  Hallucinogen use can 
lead to multiple injuries in a single night, as the dramatic example at Wesleyan College in 
Connecticut in February of 2012 when twelve people were hospitalized and five were 
arrested (Greenhouse, 2015).  Compared to these public excesses and harms, a drug taken 
in private, which has been cleared through medical channels at some point, and which 
alleviates concerns that students are not competing hard enough to be successful, is at the 
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very bottom of the list of administrative priorities. In short, there is no moral panic about 
the diversion of substances because the various potential harms are minimized by both 
liberal and neoliberal conceptions of the modern university.  As long as the initial 
prescription is medically approved, liberal educators should have no problem with it.  
Administrators see their job as maximizing student satisfaction in competition with other 
schools, while using their limited powers to protect the bodies and minds of students.  
And students see little wrong with using stimulants to study, because they have been 
naturalized to a competitive field of academic achievement based on effort and innate 
ability. 
Conclusion: Stabilizing ADHD 
Amphetamine abuse has long been a topic of moral concern, a symptom of deep 
unease with the pace and alienation of American society since the 1950s. The side effects 
of psychosis and cardiac arrest in individuals, or the hollowing out of entire communities 
under the pressures of addiction and crime, are seen as the physicals signs of a deeper 
malaise (Rasmussen, 2009). There is a world where the recent data points that 2.9% of 
Americans, 9.5 million people, are taking ADHD medication (Austerman & Muzina, 
2014), 10% of school age children can be diagnosed with ADHD (Getahun et al, 2013), 
and that 34% of college students have taken stimulant medication at some point in their 
higher educational career (DeSantis, Webb, & Noar, 2008), could in other contexts, be 
used as a rallying cry for widespread policy changes.  This is not that world. 
Though there are many critics of ADHD, and individual cases of resistance to 
drug treatment which add up to a third of untreated people who may have ADHD, the use 
of stimulant drugs in education has not prompted the kind of moral panic described 
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above. One hypothesis, a variant of Latour’s  (1987) “trials of strength” framework, 
might argue that the scientific and medical authority of the DSM and the whole edifice of 
modern psychiatry, when allied with the omnipresent legal and disciplinary resources of 
educational system, is simply too strong to be overturned by outsiders, no matter the truth 
of their arguments or strengths of their concerns.  A better explanation is that there is no 
moral panic about stimulant medication because ADHD resolves moral panics about the 
purpose and effectiveness of education. The values that are actually important in the 
educational system are being upheld, rather than subverted.  
Though ADHD represents a fracture in the modern education system between two 
different sets of values, its ability to (so far) successfully translate concerns between a 
classically liberal educational system founded on rights and access, and a neoliberal 
educational system concerned with the maximizing human capabilities and profitability, 
has prevented that fracture from growing into a crisis.  Through dual meanings in liberal 
and neoliberal regimes, ADHD creates a point of stability in a transforming economy and 
educational system, and helps assuage the concerns of relevant stakeholders like students, 
parents, teachers, doctors, and administrators.  The two moral concerns cancel out at the 
intersections, as worries about the overuse of stimulant medication and troubles of those 
least suited to focused, competitive, high-stakes educations are resolved by a system that 
provides a right to care. 
ADHD is the paradigmatic neoliberal disease.  It is no accident that current 
neurological theories of ADHD postulate a mechanism that involves weaknesses in 
“executive function”, neural circuits between the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex 
that regulate goal-seeking behavior, including plans and sustained effort on tasks 
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(Barkley, 1997). The neoliberal model of human capital extends down into the idea of the 
well-balanced life as a portfolio balanced between profitable job skills and sustaining 
family relationships and hobbies.  A disease which implies a failure of internal 
leadership, which can be corrected with drugs in the same way that new management can 
restructure a failing company into a profitable one, is the perfect way to explain the 




4. STIMULANT USE ON CAMPUS 
 This chapter examines the current usage of stimulant medication to enhance 
studying at a large American public university. The previous chapters explored the 
psychiatric, policy, and cultural history that led to an influx of stimulant medication on 
campus.  This chapter continues that history into the present by determining exactly the 
size of that influx, how students are using stimulant medication, and what it means for 
their conceptions of fairness and merit. This research attempts to go beyond prior 
surveys, which studied the prevalence of usage and students’ knowledge, and ad hoc 
narrative accounts in the media, to probe why students might be using these substances, 
the degree to which students believe that they are efficacious, and what arguments about 
the unacceptability of their use might have currency with the student body. By 
conducting a survey of 203 students, with questions guided by criticism of the use of 
stimulant medication, I aim to combine simple facts about the prevalence of use with an 
interrogation of moral reasoning. The major question to be tested was if students using 
ADHD medication without a prescription were different from the student body as a 
whole: more likely to display more acceptance of justifications for various forms of 
academic misconduct, getting better or worse grades, or see themselves in a more 
competitive academic environment. Was there any indication that students using 
stimulant medication saw this as part of a deliberate project to enhance their own 
academic abilities? 
Prior work on ADHD in higher education comes from a perspective most 
interested in the prevalence of stimulant use or administration of the student body. While 
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there is some awareness of medicalization as an explanatory factor in the rise of ADHD, 
the prior literature takes a relative uncritical stance towards the policy, medical, or social 
dimensions of this phenomenon (Bavarian et al, 2015). DeSantis et al (2008), in a large 
survey of stimulant use at a southern US college in 2006, found that 34% of their 
respondents had used stimulant medication without a prescription, that the initial use of 
the medications was associated with a period of academic stress, that medication was 
readily available, and that students were poorly educated about the health risks and 
consequences of use.  Analysis of the cross-tabs revealed a profile of a typical user, “The 
resulting data suggest that illicit use of ADHD prescription medications was significantly 
more common in men, white students, upperclassmen, and Greek members (versus non-
Greeks).”  DeSantis conducted interviews with a subset of the sample population 
revealed a pattern of justification based around utility and medical approval for stimulant 
medication.  Students drew a line between the illicit use of substances like cocaine to 
party and feel good, and the acceptable use of medication to study. The social context of 
drugs and medicine is paramount: drugs are sold by criminals, and medicine is prescribed 
by doctors. Stimulant medication is stamped with acceptability because it was prescribed 
to someone at some point, and is broadly used by the medical community.  Students saw 
themselves using stimulant medication strategically, to compensate for periods of 
particularly high academic stress, rather than as part of a regular habit or addiction. In 
combination, these factors led students to see the use stimulant medication without a 
prescription as not particularly illicit, regardless of the actual legal status of many of 
these compounds as DEA Schedule II substances (DeSantis & Hane, 2010). 
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A survey conducted at a small liberal arts school in the Northeast saw correlations 
between use of non-prescription stimulant medication, perceptions that others using non-
prescription stimulant medication were common, and that students who believed that 
using stimulant medication in this way was acceptable were more likely to do so, 
although it is unclear if beliefs influence action, or via cognitive dissonance theory, 
violating the school’s honor code by using stimulant medication caused these changes in 
beliefs (Reisinger, Rutledge, & Conklin, 2016).  A systematic review of 62 peer-reviewed 
articles published between 2000 and 2013 (Bavarian et al, 2015) revealed few strong 
national patterns in the level of non-prescription stimulant medication use across time or 
regions.  However, consistent predictors for increased use of stimulant medication were a 
student’s prior use of illegal drugs and placement at more competitive colleges, either by 
selective admission policies or ranking students.  
A particular gap in the literature that I attempted to address was student 
perceptions of the prevalence of ADHD and non-prescription stimulant medication use 
on campus.  While prior work has examined the prevalence and ethical reasoning of 
students, there has been relatively little done on students’ perceptions of the use of 
stimulant medication. Do they see it as common or rare? Are those perceptions higher 
than the actual rate, indicating hype or other kinds of cognitive biases, or lower than the 
actual rate, indicating that students hide these activities from their peers? Humans are 
social animals, and while “everybody is doing it” is not a coherent argument in favor of 
any activity, it is a common enough excuse.    
Hand-wringing articles and opinion pieces decrying the widespread use of ADHD 
medication to produce good students are a regular occurrence in major newspapers, the 
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alternative press, and college newspapers.  Particularly around 2013, with the imminent 
release of the DSM-5 with updated criteria for mental illnesses, a barrage of confessional 
pieces appeared describing the use of stimulant medication as symptom of an uncaring 
and competitive society, where individual desires of worried students and parents 
combined with the greed of the pharmaceutical industry to produce a toxic atmosphere of 
constant stimulation.  While not a systematic review, I am confident in saying that a 
contrarian attitude towards the reality of ADHD and the use of stimulant medication is a 
reliable way of generating clicks, that the idea that something is wrong with the youth 
today, and that ADHD is both a cause and a symptom, is common wisdom in the 
contemporary American intelligentsia. 
Elias Tezapsidis (2013), a New York based writer, described his college 
experience pursuing an accounting degree as one where unpleasant tasks became easier 
under a haze of drugs and where over-prescription generates skepticism about the whole 
enterprise. 
The usage of neuro-enhancing drugs is a part of the college 
microcosm, where maximum productivity in minimum time is highly 
valued. The essential advantage — or possibly the biggest problem — 
with amphetamines, such as Adderall and Ritalin, is that they make the 
very process of learning pleasant. 
I have heard users wonder if they have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD) after using the drugs. They start wondering if they too 
“suffer” from the disorder but fallaciously never got diagnosed with it. I 
never question that, because I don’t believe ADHD exists. If the ones 
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diagnosed with ADHD have the capacity to sell their prescribed drugs to 
the extent they do — as the ubiquity of Adderall on college campuses 
shows — they probably are overprescribed. God knows, they might not 
even really “need” it at all.” 
A series in the Middlebury College newspaper traced conflicts between students, 
who saw stimulant medication as just another resource for getting through their classes, 
with administrators who argued that using this tool devalued the point of a liberal arts 
education. “A major concern is the culture where students feel they need to take a drug 
like Adderall inappropriately,” [Middlebury Dean of the College Shirley]] Collado said. 
“It signals an inability as a person to press pause, slow down and make mistakes. I 
wonder what the long-term cost will be when I think about a Middlebury student if you 
fast-forward 25 years, what the impact of that thinking and rationalization is” (Finck, 
2014).  Of course, even those nominally responsible for the well-being of the student 
body have other, more pressing concerns: admitting the best possible class for the next 
year, balancing academic rigor with student satisfaction, and helping individual students 
at the margins of failure succeed. 
In extremis, ADHD may even serve as a symbol for papering over very real and 
potentially fatal dissatisfaction with life. Ted Gup (2013), a Harvard-base ethicist whose 
son was diagnosed with ADHD as a child and who overdosed on alcohol and opiates 
years later as a college student, wrote with a father’s grief.  
“No one made him take the heroin and alcohol, and yet I cannot help 
but hold myself and others to account. I had unknowingly colluded with a 
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system that devalues talking therapy and rushes to medicate, inadvertently 
sending a message that self-medication, too, is perfectly acceptable. 
My son was no angel (though he was to us) and he was known to trade 
in Adderall, to create a submarket in the drug among his classmates who 
were themselves all too eager to get their hands on it. What he did cannot 
be excused, but it should be understood. What he did was to create a 
market that perfectly mirrored the society in which he grew up, a culture 
where Big Pharma itself prospers from the off-label uses of drugs, often 
not tested in children and not approved for the many uses to which they 
are put. 
And so a generation of students, raised in an environment that 
encourages medication, are emulating the professionals by using drugs in 
the classroom as performance enhancers.” 
The line between medicine and drug becomes blurred, in a children’s game that 
mirrors the wider world of pharmaceutical marketing, but without any 
brakes.  Questioning your own modern ennui, hyperbole, and very real losses are easy 
starting points for an opinion piece, but as such represent an extreme and non-
representative group of people who believe first and foremost that their experiences are 
exceptional. Unlike the scholarly literature, these writers are willing to assign blame, but 
in their search for causality, they are too eager to scapegoat.  These extended essays, 
explorations of a life and opinion, likely do not accurately reflect the thoughts of college 
students, more concerned with the day to day pressures of grades, social life, and bill, 




Methods and Sample 
The survey was conducted in three rounds, at the end of the semester in April 
2015, November 2015, and April 2016, respectively.  Respondents were recruited by 
electronic announcement and short talks to several classes across programs, and in fliers 
posted in university libraries.  Response rates varied: responses for classes personally 
connected to the researcher were over 50%, dropping to around 10% for a simple 
electronic announcement.  It is impossible to estimate the response rate for surveys from 
fliers, but based on time of completion one third of the responses may have come from 
the fliered locations. 249 respondents started the survey, of which 203 completed the 
survey.4 Students who completed the survey could enter their email for either one of four 
$25 Amazon gift certificates in the first two rounds, or a single $100 gift certificate in the 
final round. The survey took the form of a 29 question web survey hosted on 
SurveyMonkey, with questions starting with demographics, GPA and major, use of 
stimulant medication, perceptions of the use of stimulant medication, ranking academic 
misconduct, agreement with reasons for committing academic misconduct, and finishing 
with a series of questions designed to probe questions about competitiveness, merit, and 
work ethic.  
                                                 
4 As a caveat, these results must be regarded as exploratory, rather than conclusive.  The sample size of 203 completed surveys is simply too small for many statistical tests to achieve acceptable p-values.  Sample sizes of at least 1000 would be necessary. Given that the best response rate came from large undergraduate classes where the experimenter was known to the students and completing the survey seen as part of a personal relationship, arranging those situations should be priority for future surveys. This was a convenience sample, rather than a stratified random sample. 
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Figure 1: Sample Demographics 
This sample roughly mirrors the ASU student population as of 2013 (Office of 
Institutional Analysis, 2013), the most recent year for which official data is available. 
This survey relatively oversamples Asian-Americans and people reporting multiple 
ethnicities/other, while undersampling hispanics and African-Americans.  Women 
completed the survey at slightly higher numbers than men.  For class year, juniors were 
over-represented in the sample and freshmen were under-represented, a bias due to most 
heavily promoting the study in 300-level classes which can only be taken by students 
with at least three semesters of tertiary education.  Students were asked their major, 
which was coded by the researcher into one of 10 categories.  Majors ranged across a 
variety of disciplines, with the life sciences (biology, microbiology, biochemistry), 
natural sciences (physics, chemistry), and social sciences (psychology, anthropology,  











Figure 2: Respondent Majors 
Prevalence of Use of Stimulant Medication 
This survey found that the population of people using prescribed stimulant 
medication, or using stimulant medication without a prescription, was similar to national 
averages.  7.3% of respondents reported having a prescription for stimulant medication. 
This compares to the current prevalence of ADHD in the population. This study found 
parity in the percentage of prescriptions for stimulant medication between men and 
women, against national trends of higher rates of diagnosis for boys. It is unclear why 
this happened. Though the gender gap in prescriptions has narrowed from 1991, when 
boys were prescribed Ritalin or Adderall at a rate 3.4 times higher than girls, to 2008, 
when that ratio was only 2.3, the surveyed population would have gotten their initial 
diagnosis in the years around 2006 (Sclar et al, 2012). For unknown reasons, more 











expected; the changes in gender ratio balanced with the national rates of prescription for 
ADHD medication.  
 
Figure 3: Most Recent Use of Stimulant Medication 
Removing the 16 students prescribed ADHD medication from the dataset, we 
found that 33% of students reported the non-prescription use of stimulant 
medication.  3% before college, 13% at any point in college, 9% within the past semester, 
and 8% within the past week.  Since the surveys were conducted towards the end of the 
semester, the “past week” group may include both regular users and students facing 
exceptional stress during finals.  The overall rate of usage is in line with the rates 
suggested by the prior literature, which has wide variability between 5% and 37%, with 
the most reliable and recent research suggesting that 20% of students have tried stimulant 
medication at some point in the past (McCabe et al, 2014).  Adding in the students with a 
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Figure 4: GPA vs Non-Prescription Use of Stimulant Medication 
Prior research suggests that more poorly performing students are more likely to 
use stimulant medication. The bars show the number of students in a GPA range (2.6-2.9, 
2.91-3.2, etc) who reported the non-prescription use of stimulant medication on the left 
scale, while line and right scale shows the percentage of respondents in each category 
reporting “yes” to the use of stimulant medication at any point. 4 out of 5 respondents 
with GPAs below 2.6 also reported using stimulant medication, but the low sample size 
for GPAs under 2.6 makes those results ungeneralizable.  For GPAs greater than 2.6, a 
chi-squared test does not reject the null hypothesis that GPA and the likelihood of using 
stimulant medication are independent. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms similar 
GPA distributions for students who do and do not use non-prescription stimulant 
medication. The dip for exceptional students with GPAs above 3.8 may be a statistical 
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five times larger than the one used in this survey might indicate that there may be a link 
between GPA and the non-prescription use of stimulant medication.   
Perceptions of Prevalence and Access 
The perception that stimulants are widely available on campus was confirmed by 
this survey.  Respondents were asked how many people they knew who were taking 
stimulant medication, with 73% of respondents answering in the affirmative. 20% of 
respondents indicated that they knew 7 or more people using stimulant medication, a 
result indicating that the use of stimulant medication was extremely common within their 
social circle.   
 
Figure 5: Number of People Known Taking Stimulant Medication 
Sociality is a major factor in access to stimulant medication. When asked in 
general terms, (without naming names, to prevent breaching confidentiality for anybody 
associated with the study), how they would go about obtaining stimulant medication, the 
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several common modes by which they might obtain stimulant medication. 42 respondents 
said they would seek access through medical channels, obtaining a diagnosis for ADHD 
and a prescription. Faking symptoms or just asking a doctor was seen as non-problematic; 
the medical system would work automatically to supply them with drugs at the expense 
of at least one appointment, “go to your doctor get a referral for a psychiatrist that accepts 
your insurance, make an appointment, tell them you cant focus. [sic]”.   
For informal access, respondents described four different methods. 68 
respondents indicated that they knew a single person, usually a friend, but occasionally a 
relative, roommate, or friend of a friend, who would be able to supply them with pills. 68 
other respondents related a sense that stimulant medications were ambient, and that they 
would just ask around in their classes, social circle, or dorms. Some students suggested 
that the more academically intense environments, such as Barrett Honors College, or 
science classes, would be the most likely option, while others suggested approaching 
people who “liked to party.”  A smaller group of people indicated that stimulant 
medication was available through illicit commercial links. 9 respondents said that 
recreational drug dealers also carried prescription stimulants, and that they would go to 
someone who was “connected” in this way. Six respondents said that they would go to 
the internet, either social networking sites, Craigslist, or the bitcoin-based black market 
Silk Road, before it was closed by the FBI.  Only 13 respondents (6.3% of the 
answers) reported having no idea how they maintain stimulant medication, and none of 
the response indicated any expectation that obtaining stimulant medication would present 
the slightest challenge. 
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Figure 6: How would you obtain stimulant medication? 
The survey asked respondents what percentage of students they believed had a 
prescription for ADHD medication, and what percentage were taking ADHD 
medication.  Answers varied widely, from just 1% to 80% of the student body using 
stimulant medication. On average, respondents believed that 16.5% of the student body 
had a prescription, and that 32% of the student body was taking stimulant 
medication.  The perception is that ADHD is more common than it actually is, either by 
the number from this survey or official statistics, while the perception that 32% of the 
student body is taking stimulant medication is roughly in line with the 24% of 
respondents in this survey who are either prescribed stimulants, have taken them in the 
past week, or within the past semester.   
Effects of Stimulant Medication 
A distinguishing feature of the non-prescription use of stimulants, compared to 
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grades, rather than an intrinsic chemical pleasure. It is therefore interesting to see how 
respondents believe stimulant medications work; the effects and side-effects most salient 
to their personal experiences and cultural knowledge of the substances.  In particular, the 
hypothesis that stimulant medication might be seen as a general cognitive enhancer, an 
all-purpose academic steroid, was put to the test.  In this survey, respondents were asked 
to report their perceptions of how stimulant medication worked, and if they had ever used 
it, what the effects were like in their own words.  28% of respondents indicated that 
stimulant medication did not improve grades, while 95% of respondents indicated that 
stimulant medication had at least one effect.  Improving concentration and wakefulness 
were the two more commonly reported effects, while only 5 respondents indicated that 
stimulant medication makes the user smarter.  These five people explicitly reported that 
they had never used stimulant medication: lack of experience was associated with a 
greater sense of potential for the substances.  
 
 
Figure 7: Effects of Stimulant Medication 
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Effects of Stimulant Medication
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90 of the 203 respondents provided a brief qualitative account of the drugs.  The 
most common themes were energy, alertness, focus, and motivation, along with an 
increase in mood, but many respondents also noted negative side-effects, foremost 
jitteriness, irritability, and trouble sleeping. As one respondent put it, focus did not 
always come with the ability to stay on a desired aim. “I was very focused on various 
tasks, but sometimes got too focused on things I shouldn't have been working on (like 
deep cleaning my room/bathroom as opposed to writing a paper).”  Some respondents 
saw it as superior to coffee, alertness “without the caffeine crash”, while others 
complained of feeling drained the day afterwards.  Over all, respondents saw stimulant 
medication as an effective short-terms means to increase effort on a specific task, while 
cognizant of longer term risks and trade-offs.                                                                                                                             
Academic Misconduct and Rationalization of Behavior 
A battery of questions asked respondents to rank the seven types of academic 
misconduct listed in the ASU student handbook with the addition of the non-prescription 
use of stimulant medication to study, and then asked them to agree or disagree with 
several excuses. A common argument advanced against the potential use of cognitive 
enhancement in an academic study is that it would be like the use of steroids in athletics, 
which is widely regarded as unethical and strictly regulated by professional sporting 
organizations and the NCAA. The objective of this battery of questions was to see under 
what circumstances students might consider committing academic misconduct, and to 
indicate where the non-prescription use of stimulant medication fell in this range.  The 
different forms of misconduct were pulled from the student handbook, with the addition 
of the non-prescription use of stimulant medication. By asking students to rank forms of 
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misconduct first the survey first used a small cognitive task to increase momentary 
awareness of the types of academic misconduct, and fitted the test case of non-
prescription use of stimulant medication into the respondent’s individual ethical 




Figure 8: Ranking Academic Misconduct 
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The types of academic misconduct ordered in average severity from worst to least 
bad reveal a series of standard distributions, with two major outliers. Changing a 
recorded grade is considered by 96 students to be the worst form of academic 
misconduct, nearly the same number as all other forms of academic misconduct 
(99).  One plausible explanation is that it is impossible to change a recorded grade 
without committing another crime, such as breaking into a professor’s office or hacking 
the registrar’s database. The use of stimulant medication with a prescription was at the 
bottom of the list, with 102 students choosing it as the least bad form of academic 
misconduct, compared to 78 students who picked any of the other options. From this, we 
can see that stimulant medication is seen as the least serious form of misconduct by a 
wide margin. 
Setting a behavior as academic misconduct in a handbook may not be much of a 
barrier. Academic misconduct may itself not be much of a barrier. While students were 
relatively confident that the form of misconduct they ranked highest was against the 
rules, for items at the bottom of the list, 95 students indicated that they did not know that 
their choice was academic misconduct, almost half of all responses.  
 Respondents were asked if they agreed with any of four possible rationalizations 
for committing academic misconduct: If I don't, I'll fail the class; I don't have enough 
time to do the assignment; I need to do well to be successful later in life; the assignment 
isn’t worth the time of completing it; and if the activity was never permissible, or if they 
did not know it was misconduct, for the three categories of the form of misconduct they 
ranked highest, the form of misconduct they ranked lowest, and non-prescription use of 
stimulant medication.  For the question about stimulant medication, two additional 
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responses were added: I have ADHD, and the medication was prescribed to me by a 
doctor.  The number of “Yes” answers on each rationalization was summed into a 
rationalization score, with 0 meaning no rationalizations, and 4 meaning that they agreed 
that all rationalizations served as an acceptable excuse. 
 
 
Figure 9: Rationalization for Misconduct 
Students were roughly 3.5 times more likely to agree with one of the 
rationalizations for the least severe form of academic misconduct than the most severe, 
and 2.5 times as likely to rationalize the use of stimulant medication. When primed with 
more severe consequences of academic failure (failing a class vs. succeeding at life), 
respondents were more likely to make that rationalization.  The notion that time pressures 
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and busy work assignments might be rationalizations for non-prescription use stimulant 
medication was not born out in this survey, with low response on both of those answers. 
For the non-prescription use of stimulant medication, it was interesting that some 
respondents answered in the affirmative for only one of the rationalizations “I have 
ADHD”, and “The medication was prescribed to me by a doctor.” A respondent who 
believed fully in the validity of the medical system and ADHD would believe that both 
were true, as 117 respondents did, while 33 respondents indicated that neither 
rationalizations were acceptable, possibly indicating a rejection of the validity of ADHD.  
Of the respondents who answered only one of the rationalizations, 35 supported the 
diagnosis of ADHD without a prescription from a doctor, and 22 agreed that a 
prescription was needed, even if they did not think that ADHD constituted a valid reason 
for taking stimulant medication.   
 Taking each affirmative answer to one of these rationalizations as an increase in a 
“rationalization score”, we can see that students were more likely to say that there is no 
acceptable reason for non-prescription stimulant use and the highest ranked form of 
academic misconduct than agreement with one of the rationalizations. The situation was 
reversed for lowest ranked form of misconduct, where a majority of students accepted at 
least one form of rationalization.  While a specific conclusion from these data is out of 
reach, in this study students agree with rationalizations for using stimulant medication at 
levels between their rationalizations for committing what they individually consider to be 




Competition and Fairness 
The final battery of questions asked how much respondents agreed or disagreed 
with several statements on competitiveness and fairness, using Likert scales.  Students 
indicated that academic success was very important to them, with 134 strongly agreeing, 
39 agreeing, and only 6 students registering non-committal or negative opinions to the 
question. Students were in agreement with the statement that college was a predictor of 
future life success, but also indicated a substantial degree of agreement with statements 
indicating that having fun was important. On matters of competition, students were in 
moderate agreement that they were in competition with their peers, but were generally 
unwilling to bend their ethics and cheat to catch up. 
 
Figure 10: College Priorities 
The only definition of fairness that had broad support was “Fairness means no one 
is taking advantage of anyone else”.  The two alternatives, the “level playing field” 
metaphor used by the Disability Resource Center, and a kind of blind procedural fairness, 
were only slightly more favored than disfavored. From this, we can work backwards to 
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argue that many respondents are best described as utilitarians; as long as the outcomes are 
not exploitative, then the environment should be considered fair.  
The last two definitions of fairness, “some people need a leg up” and “everybody 
is treated the same” are mutually contradictory.  However, 92 out of 203 respondents 
gave the same answer for both questions, and a further 54 gave an answer with only one 
degree of difference (e.g. “Agree” to the first definition, and “Neither Agree nor 
Disagree” to the second).  Only 57 respondents, 28%, demonstrated this basic degree of 
logical coherence in their definition of fairness. 
 
Figure 11: Competition and Fairness 
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The final question in this series asked how students defined a good student as a 
ratio of talent and hard work.  This question was designed to probe various theories of 
success, and of grit versus some sort of innate ability to excel. The results found 
overwhelming support for hard work as the best definition of a great student, and a 
general skepticism for talent. It would be interesting to compare these results to those at a 
more selective institution to see if there is greater support for talent among students who 
have been inculcated to regard themselves as talented, but that work is beyond the scope 
of this project.  A preliminary review of the literature suggests that at elite institutions of 
learning, hard work is performed as a sign of commitment to meritocracy, while actually 
working hard is devalued in favor of a commitment to an elitist ethos (Kahn, 2013).   
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Figure 12: Gifts, Hard Work, and Recognition 
As an addendum, a set of preliminary interviews on the first two rounds indicated 
that a question relating to the degree of satisfaction with the educational process might be 
interesting.  This small set of interviews (N=5) produced vehement disagreement with the 
statement that ASU recognizes great students. Some of the interview subjects reported 
that great students appeared to be actively punished by professors for going beyond the 
material or helping other students.  Since this was an unexpected result, the third round of 
surveys added questions about how well ASU recognizes and rewards great 
students.  While respondents overwhelmingly felt that individual needs were considered, 
they were more ambivalent about “recognizing and rewarding greatness”, selecting only 
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slight agreement.  While the strong feelings of the interviews did not carry through the 
third round of survey, a broad recognition of equality seems to be more in line with the 
ASU educational mission than recognizing the greatest students, whether they are hard-
working or naturally talented. 
Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test6, the two hypotheses that ADHD students 
would display higher levels of rationalization and higher levels of competitiveness were 
tested.  The data suggested the opposite. As measured by these survey questions, the 
ethical flexibility and competitiveness of students who report non-prescription use of 
stimulant medication is very similar to the answers reported by who did not use stimulant 
medication.  
Conclusion: Just Like Everyone Else 
Within the limits of my samples, there were no detectable differences between 
respondents who reported non-prescription use of stimulant medication and those who do 
not: on GPA, ethics, or competition (Figures 4 & 13).  In short, students who use 
stimulant medication are just like the student body as a whole. This survey revealed that 
non-prescription use of stimulant medication is very common on campus, with large 
majorities of respondents knowing one or more people who use stimulant medication, 
and expressing confidence in their ability to obtain stimulant medication (Figures 5 & 
6).  While 38% of respondents indicated that they had tried stimulant medication to study 
at some point, less than a third of non-prescribed users had so recently or regularly 
                                                 
6Kolmogorov-Smirnov is a standard statistical test for comparing distributions between two populations, in this case respondents who used stimulant medication and respondents who did not. 
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(Figure 3).  This, in combination with the subjective reports of feeling “energetic yet 
wired”, suggests ad hoc usage, experimentation, and overall rejection of the non-
prescription use of stimulant medication.  Respondents do not regard it as wrong, they 
regard it as ineffective.   
However, respondents identified hard work and the ability to grind through 
assignments as the key determinants of academic success (Figure 14), and deem 
increased concentration and wakefulness as the key effects of stimulant medication 
(Figure 8). Concentration and wakefulness should allow users of stimulant medication to 
increase their effort on assignments, and therefore their grades, but this claim is not born 
out either in the perceptions of my respondents, or the absence of any correlation between 
GPA and the use of stimulant medication.  
Barriers to safe and ethical use of any substance for cognitive enhancement 
include dosage, negative side effects, positive effects too small to perceive, and the 
potential hazards of addiction.  The patterns of use and response reported in this survey 
are most congruent with ad hoc, stress initiated use of non-prescription stimulant 
medication, rather than any ongoing program in human performance enhancement for 
career related ends. Claims that cognitive enhancement can be made ethical or accessible 
must first deal with the realities of proving that cognitive enhancement exists at all, and 
the difference between feeling better than human and actually being better than human.  
For college administrators who might try and regulate non-prescription stimulant 
use, a strict disciplinary approach has already failed. These substances are widely 
available through prescribing physicians entirely outside of the college system. Social 
solidarity, a desire for individual success, and the grey market of $5 transactions for pills, 
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creates an ambient environment of available stimulants, rather than clear points for 
intervention. The only point of encouragement is that repeated use seems confined to a 
small minority. The tone of the editorials at the start of this chapter, of the hollowness of 
modern life and betrayal of authentic learning at the hands of the pharmaceutical 
industry, are not born out by the responses of a representative sample of students, who 
are mostly satisfied with college on the whole.  
This section of my research has been mostly one of negative results.  My personal 
college observations—that the wide use of stimulant medication represented some kind 
of radical threat to college, and thence to intellectual work as a whole—can’t be found in 
any reasonable interpretation of the data.  Web surveys are not the right tools to probe 
questions of complex reasoning, as respondents don’t seem to pay very close attention to 
the questions.  Interviews can collect more considered data, but are time consuming to 
conduct in statistically valid sample sizes and interactive effects between the interview 
subject and researcher make it difficult to collect accurate data, as interviewees adjust 
their responses to mirror the interviewer (Fontana & Prokos, 2007). Finally, respondents 
may simply lie, or choose what they believe to be the socially preferred answer, even 
with the shield of anonymity. The key material thread through all of my negative results 
is that stimulant medications simply don’t work very well, outside of their intended role 
of countering the behavioral symptoms of ADHD. While their positive effects on 
alertness and short-term recall are well-founded in the literature (Smith & Farah, 2011), 
and immediately detectable by users, I have not been able to find a randomized control 
trial comparing the effects of stimulants on real-world performance over an extended 
period of time. Indeed, such research would be unlikely to pass the Institutional Review 
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Board process. But the fact that current substances are only partially effective is not 
grounds to relax.  As of the early 2000s, Modafinil replaced Dexedrine as the anti-sleep 
drug of choice in the US armed forces, and we can only assume that more sophisticated 
substances are in the pipeline. If a drug that ever demonstrates an immediate effect on 
intelligence were to hit the market, my data suggests a small but significant minority of 
students would try it, and administrators are ill-equipped to stop the spread of said 
hypothetical substance.    
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5. TRANSHUMAN U: DEMOCRACY AND THE ENHANCED UNIVERSITY 
This project has covered a large amount of terrain: the fluidity of a diagnosis, the 
coproduction of new civil rights and institutional knowledge, the value system of higher 
education, and finally the current status of non-prescription stimulant use at a major 
American university.  Throughout this dissertation, I have examined the many ways in 
which people, particularly students, are made “better” through policy and applied 
technology.  I now turn to the futurological question of my thesis.  If humans can be 
made “better” in the broadest possible sense of the word, should they?  What guidance do 
the major philosophical arguments concerning the embryonic practices of human 
enhancement provide, given the current status of a wide range of technologies focused 
around surpassing human limitations?  How does the past and present of treating ADHD 
inform any future attempt to increase human intelligence? 
This section is a response to a challenge by bioethicist Henry Greely and his 
coauthors (2008), in a commentary in Nature, “Towards responsible use of cognitive-
enhancing drugs by the healthy,” which starts by indicating the increased use of stimulant 
medication by college students to study, and argues: 
In different ways, each of these professions [physicians, human 
resource administrators, educators] has responsibility for fostering and 
evaluating cognitive performance and for advising individuals who are 
seeking to improve their performance, and some responsibility also for 
protecting the interests of those in their charge.”  
I disagree. This issue is too important to be left to professionals alone.  If the 
issues surrounding human enhancement are as fundamental as both proponents and 
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detractors state, than only a process involving the public as active agents, not merely 
passive receivers of knowledge, can succeed in incorporating human enhancement into 
the body politic.  
Two groups have been actively discussing these issues of applied technology for 
changing the human condition.  This section will draw on the writings of transhumanists, 
primarily The Transhumanist Reader (More and Vita-More, 2013)  and the print run of 
H+ magazine, as well as scholarly works by bioethicists aligned with the transhumanist 
movement.  I follow the transhumanists because they are a future oriented ideological 
movement: a group of people in debate about the consequences of various technological 
programs and their feasibility at this point in time. Social change can be the result of slow 
and nearly invisible forces, but when a group of people are loudly advocating for 
changes, they should be attended to first. 
 Every action inspires reaction, and the transhumanist movement has inspired an 
ongoing dialogue in defense of human nature and against the radical sociotechnological 
changes proposed by the transhumanists. Between these extreme positions defined by a 
degree of deliberate logical coherence, is the muddle of practice and public opinion, 
where some tinkering with human biology is broadly acceptable in a framework of 
treatment but less acceptable when taken as a competitive enhancement or purely self-
interested choice. I put these proposals in conversation with the idea of technological 
momentum and path dependence, the theory that technologies do not change arbitrarily, 
but are bound by their history and place within a sociotechnological system, and that the 
moments of emergence, minor choices made for reasons of convenience can become a 
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locked-n part of physical infrastructure and social training (Hughes, 1994. Mahoney, 
2000).   
My approach is sociological rather than philosophical: these are not abstract ideas 
in conflict, but the preferences of individuals and groups with varying levels of 
organization, ideology, and objectives.  Concrete physical reality pushes back against 
human beliefs; what many transhumanists desire is not attainable with present 
technology, and may not be attainable with any technology. The futuristic orientation of 
transhumanism makes many assumptions about the course of technological development, 
and the feasibility of dramatic and obviously beneficial modifications to the human form, 
against a medical research establishment which has become used to advances made on 
the most subtle points of probability in large populations (Greene, 2007).   
What follows describes three transhumanist technological programs to enhance 
human cognition, extend lifespan, and transfer personalities into computers. I will also 
lay out my own analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of the transhumanist 
movement, and respond to major critiques. I see transhumanism as a new attempt to 
grapple with ancient problems about humanity’s place in the universe and the fears of an 
individual facing death. Within those metaphysical concerns, it is also a movement 
defined as much by its schisms as its commonalities. Transhumanism is an ongoing 
conversation taking place on the internet, at conferences, and around a handful of 
established organizations like the Alcor Foundation, Singularity University, and the 
Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies.  Some transhumanists are serious and 
credible scholars, while others are enthusiasts, panglossian techno-optimists, and 
entrepreneurs most interested in selling hype for their own products and expertise.  
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Transhumanism has drawn a significant degree of negative attention, most 
explicitly by a cadre of bioethicists holding a conservative and/or religious view of the 
universe, exemplified by Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama. Kass and Fukuyama defend 
human nature as the basis of human rights and political consistency.  In their view, 
attempts to improve humans, or radically redefine life as the transhumanist program 
intends, threaten democracy and even the basic conception of ethics in pursuit of short-
term and illusory gains.  
Disability rights, education, the ontology of ADHD, and the bioethics of radically 
altering the human condition have been extensively debated individually. My 
contribution is to treat these as different approaches towards the question of how we 
define and create “better” humans. Disability rights and liberal modes of education 
included a common humanity as a fundamental construct; they move into uncertain 
territory when the definition of human normal becomes subject to change. The 
transhumanist literature frequently makes a utopian move in imagining the future of 
human enhancement that washes away deep personal and institutional commitments to 
continuity in procedures, epistemology, and concern (Jameson, 2005).  ADHD is 
frequently used as an example of human cognitive enhancement, with stimulant 
medication serving as a limited and temporary means to surpass barriers of distraction 
and lack of will.  By connecting all these parts of the enhancement discussion, I hope to 
offer some insights into the near future ethics of enhancement. 
 
The Transhumanist Program 
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Transhumanism offers an idealized vision of why and how human enhancement 
might become commonplace and, indeed, the defining feature of a future society in much 
the same way that the use of fossil fuels defined the 20th century. Max More, a longtime 
transhumanism evangelist and philosopher defines transhumanism inclusively as “the 
view that it is both possible and desirable to overcome biological limitations on human 
cognition, emotion, and physical and sensory capabilities, and that we should use science, 
technology, and experimentation guided by critical and creative thinking to do so” (More, 
2013). More attempts maximum inclusivity, both within and without the transhuman 
movement. He locates transhumanism as the natural successor to the humanist tradition 
and Enlightenment ideals: that the course of history is affected by human agency and that 
applied rationality in a framework of individual choice and shared governance offers the 
best chances for more frequently choosing wise courses of action.  According to More, 
the intellectual ancestors of transhumanism can be seen in early 20th century scientific 
visionaries like J.B.S Haldane, J.D. Bernal, and Nikolai Federov, with a major influence 
from Charles Darwin. The most succinct definition of transhumanism might be “It is time 
for humans to guide their evolutionary destiny.” 
More gestures at an ongoing political divide in transhumanism, between Ayn 
Rand-inspired libertarianism which sees in the development of transhuman capacities the 
ability to enable a utopia of rational supermen, and an alliance of self-described 
technoprogressives, who argue that the ability of technology to ameliorate human 
suffering must ethically be made available to as many people as possible, not just 
(wealthy, white) early adopters. Furthermore, governmental paradigms focused solely on 
individual liberties are inadequate to manage risk in complex systems, or collectively 
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allocate planetary resources. Technoprogressives seek innovations in institutional 
structures to match newly extended capabilities. Rather than design new men who abide 
by the rules of the new society by nature, a common trope in utopian plans ranging from 
the spiritual practices of religious communes in 19th century America, to the New Soviet 
Man of Communism, or the Objectivist seasteader, technoprogressives see a co-evolution 
between capacities for empathy and reason, and upgrades to the antique “operating 
system” of representative and parliamentary democracy (Pellissier, 2011). 
Transhumanism is a distinctly techno-political movement, and it is important to 
document the ways in which different technological projects have led to different social 
organizations, and different kinds of failure modes.  Max More’s inclusive definition is 
an attempt to bridge distinct worldviews, linked to three major theories of the key 
transhumanist technology. The three major classes of transhumanist technological 
factions are the cryonicists, the uploaders, and the rejuvenators, all of whom are focused 
on the key task of avoiding death.  It is important to note that these are proposed 
directions for research; while they represent real differences of opinion, and in particular 
concentrations of financial and intellectual power, actual results that would point to any 
one of these approaches being possible are perennially just over the horizon.  The group 
that succeeded first would reap the rewards common to pioneers in any number of 
breakthrough technologies. 
Cryonics is the most established of the transhumanist research programs, with a 
core aim of cryogenically preserving human beings, or in some cases heads, just at the 
point of death, with the goal of revival at some future time when the proximate cause of 
death and freezing-induced cellular damage may be repaired through nanomachinery or 
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whole organ regeneration. Cryonics extends the commonplace cryogenic preservation of 
biological samples with the idea that a whole organism can be frozen, placed into 
biological stasis, and then returned to life.  At the edge of the death, the body is rapidly 
cooled and then injected with a cryoprotectant solution based on DMSO (dimethyl 
sulfoxide) and ethylene glycol, a cell-penetrating antifreeze solution. From a 
philosophical standpoint, cryonics advocates argue for a redefinition of death based on 
information theory. Information-theoretic death is the point at which such damage has 
occurred that it is impossible to restore the patient to life. This stands in contrast to brain 
death, the absence of brain activity or response to stimuli, and traditional definitions of 
death that involved the ceasing of the heart. Since the cryopreservation procedures must 
be started as soon as possible to avoid decay, there is a possibility that cryopreservation 
involves injecting a toxic solution into a still alive (but invariably rapidly declining) 
person.  As such, a major focus of cryonicist rhetoric has been analogizing their work to 
the ethics of organ transplantation 
 Cryonics broke into the mainstream with the 1964 publication of Robert 
Ettinger’s The Prospect of Immortality. Bob Nelson, a Los Angeles television repairman 
and entrepreneur, described hearing about Ettinger’s work on the radio and being 
entranced with the vision of ending death.  Nelson founded the Cryonics Society of 
California and cyropreserved the first human in 1967.  Nelson’s ambitions exceeded his 
expertise and his finances, and over several years financial trouble, failures of Nelson’s 
primitive equipment, and the undeniable deaths of all the people he had preserved, led to 
the dissolution of the Cryonic Society in 1974. Nelson was the target of a major lawsuit 
alleging he defrauded his customers. Nelson was personally absolved of wrongdoing, but 
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the aura of scam persists around cryonics (Nelson, Bly & Magaña, 2014).  
 Cryonics is an option today, with the leading group being the Scottsdale, Arizona, 
based Alcor Foundation, headed by Max More. For $200,000 for the whole body, or 
$80,000 for just the head, Alcor will preserve a human being.  The quality of current 
techniques is under dispute. While Alcor insists that it provides state-of-the-art care, 
insider exposés and lawsuits allege staff fumbling a cryopreservation procedure because 
of basic errors like lacking checklists and playing catch with the frozen head of Ted 
Williams (Pein, 2016). Cryonics has also been implicated in marriage difficulties, where 
one partner will seek to be preserved, while the partner that does not believe in cryonics 
sees this as a waste of money and an abandonment of the relationship for a post-human 
future. There are now ‘cryonics widows’ support groups for women who do not wish to 
follow their husbands into the freezer (Howley, 2010)  
 Cryonics remains a durable feature of the transhumanist landscape, despite a 
notable lack of progress on successful reversing cryopreservation on any animal more 
advanced than C. elegans, a nematode used as a model organism in biology (Vita-More 
& Barranco, 2015). In my own discussions with Alcor-related cryonicists, they seemed 
extremely defensive about an actual hard test of their method, such as preserving and 
reviving a small mammal. This durability is in some ways due to the personalities 
involved: Max More is both the CEO of Alcor and an atypically charismatic contributor 
to transhumanist discourse who has attempted to create an acceptable canon for the 
movement in The Transhumanist Reader. Cryonics offers immediate evidence that it does 
something, even if all the necessary pieces are not yet functional. Simply by signing up 
for Alcor, interested individuals can be assured that they will be preserved, if not revived. 
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Compared to the major scientific project involved in uploading and rejuvenation, 
cryonics can be pursued by a moderately wealthy individual, with the hope that some 
future society will develop the technology to successfully revive cryo subjects.  
Uploaders believe that the mind can be separated from the body and instantiated 
in a more durable substrate than 3 pounds of neurons. The uploader program makes a 
series of assumptions about philosophy of mind; that the mind--memories, personality, 
qualia---exist as functions encoded in the structure of the brain, and that these structures 
can be read out and recreated in some kind of computer hardware, duplicating the self, 
which can then be backed up or upgraded as necessary (Koene, 2013).  As preliminary 
steps towards uploading, Koene argues for a much better understanding of the brain 
structure through techniques like automatic tape-collecting lathe ultramicrotome, where a 
preserved section of brain is sliced and electron microscoped in layers, which are then 
reconstructed to form a 3D neural map.  This technique has seen success in mapping 
areas of about 1000 neurons in the visual cortex of a mouse, with the ability to 
distinguish between inhibitory and excitatory neurons (Bock et al, 2011. Briggman, 
Helmstaedter, & Denk, 2011).  However, this process (if it works) requires dead and 
preserved brains. Due to the break in continuity of consciousness, minds uploaded 
through this technique may be mere copies, rather than the same individual. 
Another proposed technique that preserves continuity of consciousness is the 
Moravec process.  In the Moravec upload, neurons are replaced one by one with artificial 
replicas, which preserve the full functionality of the neuron while also being digitally 
accessible.  By definition, at each step the entire brain continues functioning as before, 
but once the process is completed it consists of Moravec digital neuron equivalents 
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(Moravec, 1995). While it is currently possible to interface with a single neuron 
electrically, the signal generation and processing hardware is much larger than the neuron 
that may be replaced.  Since first proposed in 1988, Moravec’s procedure is a thought 
experiment, with major work to be done in areas of biocompatibility, synaptic rather than 
electrical connections, and the murky area of the ambient chemical environment of the 
brain, as opposed to immediate electrical connections with clear comparisons to circuitry. 
A third approach to uploading minds is to build a computer system which models 
a generic human brain, and then use detailed brain recordings from fMRI, EEG, or 
similar techniques to match that generic brain with that of a specific human. A pair of 
major programs in 2013, the American BRAIN initiative and the European Human Brain 
Project unveiled decade-long, multimillion dollar proposals to map the human brain and 
develop paradigmatic breakthroughs in neuroscience. These “big science” projects, 
however, are distinct from the many leaps required to emulate a human brain.  The US 
BRAIN initiative describes its focus areas as:  
Generate a census of cell types, create structural maps of the brain, 
develop new large-scale network recording capabilities, develop a suite of 
tools for circuit manipulation, link neuronal activity to behavior, delineate 
mechanisms underlying human imaging technologies, create mechanisms 
to enable collection of human data, [and] disseminate knowledge and 
training. (Bergmann & Newsome, 2013)  
These fundamental research targets are set to understand and develop cures for 
neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and traumatic brain injuries. The 
BRAIN initiative includes a neuroethics component similar to the Ethical, Legal, and 
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Societal Implications (ELSI) program of the Human Genome Project, which has not yet 
considered uploading as an ethical matter, but recommends ethicist input at all levels of 
the research program (Gutman & Wagner, 2014). 
The American BRAIN project takes a pluralistic, basic research-first inspired 
approach based around consensus in the major stakeholder agencies: the National 
Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, and Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency.  The European Human Brain Project is described as a more visionary 
project, centers around the work of Henry Markram and recreating the brain in-silico. 
Despite $1.3 billion Euro funding, a significant portion of the European neuroscience 
community opposes the project as insufficiently rigorous in hypothesis testing and going 
directly for simulation without sufficient data to verify the correctness of the simulations 
(Frégnac & Laurent, 2014).  Even this more simulation-oriented program does not see 
uploading as a crucial research aim; instead, research goals are increased accessibility to 
viable simulations of the brain through a scalable and verified programming interface 
capable of examining neural activity from gene expression through whole brain regions 
(Markram & Hellgren-Kotaleski, 2015). 
The uploaders share a significant overlap with some members of the artificial 
intelligence (AI) community, in particular the fast take-off Singularity school associated 
with Ray Kurzweil.  Kurzweil argues that human-like AI is a matter of processing power 
and that the hardware supporting previous AI efforts in the 1950s and 1980s was at best 
equivalent to an insect.  Extrapolating from Moore’s law, the expectation that the density 
of transistors in an integrated circuit doubles every 18 months, in 2005 Kurzweil argued 
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that by 2020 human-equivalent AI would be possible on $1,000 computer hardware 
(Kurzweil, 2006). 
Though AI seeks to either code human-equivalent sentience from first principles 
or use some kind of generalized learning system and large datasets to train the proper 
responses, while uploading seeks to emulate human neurology as the only existing 
physical system that exhibits intelligence, there is a close philosophical kinship between 
an artificial being created in silicon, and a former human now living in a computer 
system.  The singularitarians extend this kinship by noting that as ever-increasing speeds 
are a durable part of the computing landscape, and that an AI will be able to modify and 
optimize its own code, a human-level AI or upload should rapidly become super-human.  
This of course assumes that any technical problems of increasing intelligence or desired 
capacities are within the ability of the AI to understand and that manipulating some part 
of the system can be done without causing negative cascading effects through the rest of 
the system. Though in crude measures, the data in a super-computer is equivalent to some 
representations of the data in a human brain, Kurzweil’s predictions about radical 
qualitative transformations in computing have not been born out, and certainly not at the 
cost or scale envisioned (Rennie, 2010). With uploaded minds or human-equivalent AI 
still fictional, the idea of hacking and improving these systems is fiction built on fiction. 
Rejuvenators, the third techno-political approach, argues that the cellular changes 
associated with aging are preventable and ultimately reversible. Starting with accepted 
medical practice of proper diet, regular exercise, and avoiding smoking, rejuvenators 
argue that with death as the ultimate and universal evil, medical research should be 
systematically devoted towards reversing the “seven deadly sins” of aging, rather than ad 
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hoc wars against cancer, heart disease, Alzheimer's, etc. (DeGrey, 2008).  Aging is a 
distributed, molecular and cellular process, and by targeting cell loss, cell senescence, 
accumulation of lysosomal junk, extracellular junk, sugar-protein molecular bonds, and 
mutations in mitochondrial and nuclear DNA, medical technology can eliminate the 
differences between young and old tissues, and therefore prevent death entirely, rather 
than working around a cascade of organ failures associated with old age. Anti-senescence 
techniques anticipate advances in enzyme manipulation, stem cell therapy, and genetic 
repair in adult cells. DeGrey’s argument is that individual cures for diseases will soon 
cease to show improvements in lifespan, as the vast number of comorbid conditions at 
advanced age mean that a avoiding heart disease becomes a death from cancer a few 
months later, or respiratory failure in bedbound senile patients.  Only an approach that 
tackles mortality at its root can meaningfully improve quality of life. 
 Rejuvenation is the least radical transhumanist program in terms of its 
philosophical implications for identity and society, at least compared to a significant 
population of uploads or people in various states of cryopreservation and resurrection. 
While the idea that death is a necessary and fulfilling component of the human 
experience is common to many belief systems, very few people express a desire to die 
immediately, or even in the short term. Death is almost always something to be put off 
for the future.  However, in practical terms rejuvenation requires working with living 
bodies in situ, with all the implications for FDA regulation and lack of clarity on results. 
Both cryonics and uploading require at least one, if not multiple breakthroughs to become 
effective technologies.  Rejuvenation requires those breakthroughs to occur in a realistic, 
not merely theoretical context.  
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Transhumanist Ideology and California Cyberculture 
Transhumanism can be seen as a technological project involving human beings 
and as a related the social movement attempting, but it is perhaps best represented as a 
worldview, a characteristic style of thought. Max More argues that transhumanism builds 
off of the humanist tradition, but viewing humans as an evolutionary step between an 
animal past and a technological future is as much of a rupture from the humanistic 
formulation of inherent human rights, as humanism was from a world defined by an 
external divinity.  The origin that More elides in the transhumanist story is the idea of the 
cyborg and a particularly California kind of faith in self-improvement through high 
technology, psychedelic experiences, and appropriation of Eastern mysticism. Cyborgs, 
now a staple of science-fiction and a metaphor for socio-technical-biological chimeras 
(Haraway, 1991), were originally conceived by Clynes and Kline (1995), a pair of 
clinical psychologists, in 1960 as the ideal astronaut, a self-regulating system capable of 
enduring the rigors of outer space. To the idea of biological self-control in extreme 
circumstances, transhumanism adds the exploration of inner space, and the creation of 
new kinds of minds as well as bodies. 
It is unclear if the links between psychedelic expansion, radical politics, and 
computer innovation that characterized Silicon Valley were causal or merely 
associational, but it is clear that Palo Alto in the 60s and 70s was the site of epochal 
cultural and technological revolution, where “parallels between mind expansion through 
the use of psychedelic drugs and through the new kinds of computing that were being 
developed around the Stanford campus” (Markoff, 2006) laid the groundwork for the 
omnipresent personal computerization of the 21st century. The attitudes towards the self 
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and technology that characterized the invention of the personal computer at the Xerox 
PARC lab are the most obvious emotional predecessors of the transhumanist movement. 
For those who lived in the world of the personal computer revolution, where lab director 
and human-computer interaction pioneer Doug Engelbart’s dream was realized, and the 
computational power of the computer was trivially accessible through a visual interface, 
the next step would be to further unite the mind the computer, both in the sense of the 
cyborg, but also in the sense of the continual upgrade path made possible through 
Moore’s Law.  More powerful than any reality is the perception that a solution to any 
particular problem is just around the technological curve, for much less money. 
H+ Magazine provides a useful look into the California ideology of the 
transhumanist movement. As an artifact, H+ magazine is a glossy 80 page publication, 
covering in roughly equal parts the latest scientific developments, short essays on a 
variety of topics, and reviews of books and movies from a transhumanist perspective. It 
welcomes interaction and exploration; many articles include hyperlinks to sources and 
online discussions. Though the magazine is purely digital, being distributed as a pdf file , 
the graphic style, editorial tone, and general feel is strongly reminiscent of a print copy of 
Wired. In fact, the driving force behind H+ magazine is the editor, R.U. Sirius. R.U. 
Sirius is an exemplar of a certain flavor of Silicon Valley culture.  A former Yippie7 and 
devoted acid freak, he co-founded and edited Mondo 2000 and wrote regularly for Wired 
in the early 90s. R.U. Sirius draws from the same underlying cultures as transhumanism: 
                                                 
7 The Yippies (Youth International Party) were a radical 1960s counter-culture movement founded by Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, notable for media stunts like nominating a pig named Pigasus for president at the 1968 democratic convention and dumping dollar bills on the New York Stock Market Trading Floor. Their actions were widely derided as distractions by the Political Left of the period. 
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the excitement and wonder of science-fiction, the technological mastery of computer 
hacking, and the personal experimentation and anti-authoritianism of psychedelia.  As 
R.U. Sirius describes his own life trajectory after deciding to be a hippie in 1967: 
The tech thing was not so natural a fit for me. I wasn’t a science or 
science fiction nerd. But one of the ideas that was going around in the 
counterculture of the ‘60s was that technology would eliminate boring and 
alienating types of labor. For some of us, this functioned as an excuse to 
live the way we wanted to.  And then, a number of counterculture 
spokespeople, including William Burroughs, Stewart Brand, Timothy 
Leary and Robert Anton Wilson were talking about tech and science as 
being a way towards a transformative and far out future — what Leary 
called science faction. I was utterly infected by that thinking. But I was 
also infected in the ‘70s by punk and new wave.  So these various forces, 
psychedelia, tech/science and the speediness and sharpness of punk and 
new wave kind of collided in my brain. After a 500 microgram LSD trip, I 
decided to create a “neopsychedelic wave” combining those influences. 
(Fahey, 2014) 
Editing a transhumanist magazine was the natural evolution of Sirius’s orientation, from 
radical psychedelic politics to cyberculture and technological disruption.  
H+ magazine represents a neatly packaged synthesis of the transhumanist 
movement, with greater effort and permanence than the ad hoc collection of blogs and 
personal websites that most transhumanist discussion occurred on. H+ magazine is 
particularly useful as a representative sample of transhumanist thought because it 
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contains articles by almost every leading transhumanist writer, and is designed both to 
introduce transhumanism to a general audience, and develop a common frame of 
reference among transhumanists that encompasses both libertarian and progressive 
politics. 
H+ Magazine article topics are wide ranging: nanotechnology, brain scanning and 
neural interfaces, genetic engineering, how to cadge modafinil from your doctor and get 
started with do it yourself biotech, as well as pop culture interviews with the creators of 
shows with transhumanist themes like Battlestar Galactica: Caprica and the fiction of 
Philip K. Dick.  The tone is relentlessly optimistic and irreverent. The 2008 Financial 
Crisis is a mere speed bump on the path towards strong AI management of the economy 
and a network of global power satellites which will provide energy too cheap to meter 
(Lightman, 2009). Advertising provides a measure of the success of a publication, and by 
this measure H+ Magazine never achieved viability.  There are four ads in each issue: for 
the Alcor cryonics foundation, for knome personal genetic testing, for a nutritional 
supplement called Neurvana, and for the next transhumanist/AI conference. This reflects 
a narrow base of financial support. After a brief spurt of productivity around 2009, H+ 
magazine returned to a weekly blog format with a rotating set of authors and more 
amateurish web design (Hay, 2014). 
Bioconservatism: In Defense of Human Nature 
Every thesis has its antithesis, and the plan for technological improvement that 
undergirds the transhumanist ethos has attracted a wide degree of criticism from thinkers 
broadly aligned in the bioconservative movement, a stance in bioethics that holds that 
most of, if not all of the transhumanist position is misguided and dangerous. As well as 
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pragmatic concerns about safety, efficacy, and equality, the bioconservative critique of 
enhancement moves along two major lines: (1) the necessity of a fixed human nature as a 
foundation for a political stability and (2) limits to ambition as a component of ethical 
thought.  
For Francis Fukuyama, modern society is sustained by a delicate balance of 
legislative precedents, innate rights, and the biological past of humans.  “Human nature 
shapes and constrains the possible kinds of political regimes, so a technology powerful 
enough to reshape what we are will have possibly malign consequences for liberal 
democracy and the nature of politics itself” (Fukuyama, 2003, p.7).  Basic equalities in 
the origins of capacities and the inevitability of death provide the foundations for 
democratic participation, meritocratic promotion, and the slow but necessary change of 
society. Fukuyama, following Rawls and Kant, describes society as founded on the basis 
of an essential moral ordering that arises from the dignity of an intrinsic human nature 
(Fukuyama, 2003, p.156).  When pressed on the exact nature of this dignity or human 
nature, Fukuyama begs the question.  It cannot be language, because some humans 
cannot speak.  It cannot be the ability to feel suffering, because animals experience pain 
and are not human. 
Fukuyama identifies the foundational quality that makes politics and liberal 
democracy possible as Factor X, unknown and unknowable.   
What is Factor X? That is, Factor X cannot be reduced to language, or 
sociability, or sentience, or emotions of consciousness, or any other 
quality that has been put forth as a ground for human dignity.  It is all of 
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these qualities coming together in a human whole that makes up Factor X 
(Fukuyama, 2003, p.171). 
Having postulated advances in biotechnologies as a threat to human nature, 
Fukuyama then defines human nature as the emergent qualities of a genetic endowment 
so delicate to contemporary conditions that any changes must be a threat.  In particular, 
the increased control over human biology applied by systematic enhancement is liable, in 
his view, to lead to a social hierarchy based on quality of genetic alterations, increased 
competition and a decrease in social cohesion, and a utilitarian ethos overwhelming 
individual rights and responsibilities. The only proper response is government regulation 
to intervene and control enhancement, life extension, and cloning technologies in order to 
preserve the current foundations of democracy. 
In the report Beyond Therapy, Leon Kass and Presidential Bioethics Council 
make a comprehensive argument against a variety of transhumanist proposals, arguing 
that the desire to remake, extend, and perfect the human form is a kind of hollow 
Prometheanism. Striving and true excellence can only be obtained within a context of 
flaws and limits: 
This attitude is to be faulted not only because it can lead to bad, 
unintended consequences; more fundamentally, it also represents a false 
understanding of, and an improper disposition toward, the naturally given 
world. The root of the difficulty seems to be both cognitive and moral: the 
failure properly to appreciate and respect the ‘giftedness’ of the world. 
(Kass, 2003). 
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  What Kass and co-authors dance around, in this language of Promethean hubris 
and unintuitive negative consequences, can be concisely explained as the doctrine of 
Original Sin: humans are innately flawed, and the proper course of a well-led life is 
developing the grace to accept and love one’s own flaws and the flaws of others. 
Bioconservatism sees in the transhumanist program not only the mundane risks of new 
technology—that they may have unintended side effects or not work as well as 
advertised—but a set of existential risks so great that even small steps in a transhumanist 
direction lead towards disaster.  
The Chimera of Treatment and the Correct Analogy 
Bluntly, very few people are strict transhumanists or bioconservatives.  Rather 
than making decisions based on some essential human nature, which is either continually 
changing or the final fixed point around which other things orbit, most people and 
institutions are logical morasses of qualified beliefs, contextual judgements, and business 
as usual.  My surveys point to this, with the many respondents noting that the use of 
ADHD medication is acceptable with a doctor’s prescription. If an intervention is regular, 
is done according to professional best practices, is deployed in a manner to treat a 
disease, then it is socially acceptable. An enhancement which is radical, which does not 
fit into accepted medical practice, and which is used by an already healthy person is 
suspect.  In short, the conventional wisdom is that the treatment/enhancement distinction 
is clear in all but a few fringe cases, and useful guidance for implementing or regulating 
emerging technologies.  Against this conventional wisdom, both transhumanists and 
bioconservatives argue that the treatment/enhancement distinction is not a clear 
boundary, and is entirely insufficient. 
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The strongest claim in favor of the treatment/enhancement distinction is that: 
 The biomedical sciences for humans, like the veterinary sciences for 
animals, study both the variation in the functional organization typical for 
our species and the departures from normal functioning that we call 
disease and disability. The line between disease and disability and normal 
functioning is thus drawn in the relatively objective and nonevaluative 
context provided by the biomedical sciences, broadly construed (Daniels, 
2000).  
Treatments are those which return a patient to normal functioning, as objectively 
defined by the sciences. The question therefore becomes one of determining the 
“normal”, of properly diagnosing disease and disability.  As the prior chapters 
demonstrate this is anything but relatively objective.  The process of defining a disease 
and its proper treatment, of fitting it into medicine as it is practiced by human beings, 
involves constant micropolitical negotiations of expectations. For categories which are 
non-trivial to define, such as intelligence, personality, or aging, the normal and the 
abnormal become categories of evaluation, and a means of systematically extending 
subjectivity across a collection of individuals (Rose, 1990. Bowker & Star, 1999).  
 On the bioconservative side of the debate, Kass argues that the 
treatment/enhancement debate invites ethicists to wander down a semantic rabbit-hole of 
definitions and medical vagueness, to become lost in statistics about normal curves and 
where those curves shade into abnormality.  These discussions distract from “Proper 
ethical questions: What are the good and bad uses of biotechnical power? What makes a 
use ‘good,’ or even just ‘acceptable’?” (Kass, 2003)  A focus on motive, on the second 
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and third order effects of an intervention in society, and on defending human nature in all 
its vagaries is the terrain that Kass stakes out. 
Similarly, the transhumanist side notes that many enhancements to natural 
capabilities are already considered to be a basic part of civilization: high nutrient diets 
from agriculture, literacy, vaccines, and eyeglasses all being “enhancements” with 
relatively recent presence in human history, if what we are concerned about is alterations 
from a state of nature (Crow, 2012).  To argue that the biomedical features of an 
intervention are what make it problematic is arbitrary and reduces human beings to their 
biological qualities (Buchanan, 2011). The widespread rise in IQ test scores over the past 
century, the Flynn effect, appears to be one such enhancement due to better childhood 
nutrition and education (Flynn, 1987).  If this change is considered to be good, so might 
the widespread use of intelligence enhancing drugs.  
Transhumanists and bioconservatives are two sides of similar scholarly tradition 
that takes defining human nature and “the good life” as a key explanatory role. This 
approach of reasoning from first principles is proper for philosophers, but few people are 
philosophers, or even philosophically coherent.  One might throw up his or her hands at 
this; give up philosophy in favor of asking people how they would decide in a given 
situation and then retroactively creating a standard for decisions from what is publically 
acceptable, a kind of collective ethics as a French group has done with self-driving cars 
programmed to crash in ways that endanger their occupants in favor of more vulnerable 
pedestrians (Bonnefan, Shariff, & Rahwan, 2015). This approach however, would also be 
a dereliction of scholarly duty, to merely observe what the public considers acceptable 
today without thinking about how norms should evolve in the future.  
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“Humanness” is questioned, mangled, and made through processes and 
technologies far less fantastical than a Moravec brain replacement or a society defined by 
a genetic caste system.  For those involved in the transhumanist debate, future 
technologies are a key tool to think with, because of their wide-reaching effects: cryonic 
suspension, minds in computers, biological immortality, and vastly increased human 
potentials. However, the effort to demarcate between proper uses of technologies, for 
both approaches, misses the immense adaptations that humans have already made, and 
the way in which everyday miracles of science and technology become mundane, even 
sources of complaint. In the interstices of civil rights, biomedicine, drug diversion, and 
academic competition, people create their own working definition of what acceptable 
human norms are, right now. Those norms change slowly, even the relatively rapid 
redefinition of disability rights explored in chapter 2 took years from writing Section 504 
to implementing regulations, and decades more to extend even incompletely outwards 
into society. I think a worthwhile project for all concerned is to defend notions of the 
human today; not in some utopian future or idealized past, but in institutions that embody 
liberal values about the power of the knowledge, and the importance that the ability to 
use that knowledge responsibly be distributed as widely as possible. 
 A great deal of work has gone into substantive assessments of future technologies, 
and into building democratic participation into the process. A full review of these projects 
in responsible innovation, real-time technology assessment, or epistemic democracy is 
beyond the scope of this section, but I would like to note that a proper choice of analogies 
matter for these sorts of futurology exercises.  There are many details of any future 
technology, but only a few cognitive schema which offer explanation in a sea of noise.  
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The typical analogies about transhumanist technologies say that it’s like medicine, 
because it involves intervening in and improving human bodies. Or perhaps it is a matter 
of code, because information and computation are the dominant technologies of the 
present, and by rewriting the genetic and neural “codes” of people we can then improve 
them. I use the analogy of education, because it directs our attention towards a site that 
we all understand as students and that many of us understand as teachers as well, a site 
that reminds us that these processes are incremental and rarely proceed in an orderly 
fashion in the wake of single massive new technology or idea, and a site which has 
traditionally been governed by democratic norms, both internally as the “republic of 
knowledge” and externally with the support of the State. 
Conclusion: Towards Transhuman U 
If at one point universities had a clear purpose, say the human development of 
students in accordance with the values of knowledge, that mission is now merely one 
among many. The modern university, responsive to the needs of an increasingly 
diversified, specialized, and expert driven economy, created a similarly responsive and 
customizable set of classes, programs, and certificates, as opposed to the one-size-fits all 
humanistic canon or the classical trivium and quadrivium. The intellectual development 
provided by classes is just one part of a holistic personal development that involves 
opportunities for community service, on-campus social life, intramural athletics, healthy 
dining, and hands-on career development. I would like to suggest that transhumanism can 
provide a guiding principle for universities and can serve to build better humans and 
better communities. 
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 According to surveys of how students spend their time, academics may be one of 
the least important parts of the college experience, with an average of 16.5 hours per 
week spent on academic activities (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Classes are 
deliberately unstructured to facilitate independent learning and time management skills. 
Evaluative and grade-point intensive exams and major papers are crammed into a few 
weeks in midterms and at the end of the semester.  
Currently, as my survey shows, stimulant medication is widely available on 
campus, thanks to the high rate of prescription for ADHD nationwide.  My survey 
population sees hard work as more important to success than innate talent, and while 
severe forms of cheating are unacceptable, certain moral compromises can be made for 
lesser violations.  Within the conventional structure, there are few good options for 
college administrators.  Disciplinary and counseling resources are insufficient to punish 
clear violations of academic integrity, student safety, and self-harm, let alone expand the 
eye of surveillance to the 31% of students who at some point have used stimulant 
medication without a prescription.  Though by Foucault’s theorization, the action of the 
panopticon does not require constant surveillance to have a disciplinary effect, it must 
cultivate an aura of omnipresence and omnipotence, a far cry from the overworked, 
cautious, and “responsive” administrative culture in vogue.  Students these days know 
they are customers and that the customer is always right. 
 The risks of the kinds of non-prescription use of stimulant medication discussed 
in Chapter Four are worrying.  Amphetamines are an addictive and legally controlled 
substance; students can experience very severe health and legal consequences from what 
they see as a reasonable use of stimulants.  When we add substances with relatively short 
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and undocumented histories of human use to the mix, the possible outcomes are only 
more dangerous.  Students, non-experts, could take large doses of, or combine drugs that 
would be otherwise safe, but together become dangerous.  Proscribing cognitive 
enhancement only discourages students from seeking assistance, if there are disciplinary 
consequences attached to the use of cognitive enhancement or even mandatory health 
leave, students will be loath to jeopardize their careers or expose themselves to the 
disapproval of peers and family members by seeking assistance with pharmacological 
cognitive enhancement. 
 The current administrative response towards cognitive enhancement is failing and, 
as cognitive enhancements become more capable and more common, the failures in the 
system will only become more apparent.  University administrators should move towards 
an active response that recognizes the realities of the situation on the ground.  
Universities have always been sites of cognitive enhancement, of helping people to think 
more clearly, and in the 21st century that means grappling with the neurological 
components of “better,” as well as the cultural and skill-based aspects.  What if the 
university should sponsor the use of cognitive enhancement through an office similar to 
the existing Counseling Service, or office of Disability Support Services? 
Avoiding the negative consequences of cognitive enhancement abuse is a 
compelling but ultimately insufficient reason to warrant such a radical change in 
academic policy.  I believe that facilitating access to cognitive enhancement is in line 
with the aims of the academy.  Education is supposed to not only grant familiarity with a 
body of knowledge but also to equip students with the skills to learn throughout their life 
and to enable them to use the mental extensions common to their time and place.  Writing 
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and reading is at the core of the basic curriculum, to which modern scholarship has added 
the use of computers and electronic resources. The task of higher education is mind 
expansion, not in the sense of psychedelic upgrading implied by the California ideology 
but through fostering minds to flourish in their own paths, to link new ideas to fulfilling 
lives in the Deweryian sense. As pharmacological cognitive enhancement becomes more 
possible, that should include familiarizing students with the use of, and the risks related 
all methods of cognitive enhancement. With the already close tracking of student 
performance, the balance between solidarity and competition, the expectation to try and 
succeed at new things, there is a space for an institutional shift that treats cognitive 
enhancement not as a patch to get through poor time management during finals week but 
as an integrated experiment towards positive cognitive enhancement for an entire 
community. An integrated education includes textbooks, problem sets, labs, healthy sleep 
and diet habits, and the appropriate use of mind extending tools, including computer 
programs and stimulant substances from caffeine to modafinil. The goal is to avoid 
crystalizing a culture of misuse, akin to much of the status of alcohol on campus today, 
where abuse and over-indulgence leads to deaths and serious crime.  
One social objective of universities is promoting social justice. A common 
critique of cognitive enhancement is that it will increase the gap between rich and poor.  
Colleges can subsidize cognitive enhancement in the same way that they subsidize 
tuition, ensuring that people of all socio-economic backgrounds have access to the 
benefits new technologies and techniques. There will always be divisions on campus: 
indeed the structure that attaches students to majors and extracurricular clubs seems in 
some instances to create tribalism, with sports rivalries between schools the greatest 
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example. Though universities cannot force students to ignore pre-existing class and racial 
distinctions, they can encourage tolerance and diversity. Through governing and 
regulating cognitive enhancement, rather than simply banning it wholesale, universities 
can avoid exacerbating the division between enhanced “haves” and mundane ”have-nots” 
identified as a threat to a democratic future by both Fukuyama and Buchanan. 
The single largest problem is facing any implementation of a cognitive 
enhancement technology is currently separating hype from fact, from linking 
improvements in indicators such as levels of brain chemistry or short-term performance 
to long-term gains. Good science is currently devalued in favor of either off-label use of 
prescribed drugs or in the unregulated field of nutritional supplements (Dietary 
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994). As long as cognitive enhancement 
remains on the fringes of cognitive science, rigorous double-blind studies will not be 
pursued.  There is a long tradition of using university students as research subjects, and 
while the ethical obligations are far from clear, the interest of universities in the long-
term well-being of the student body mitigates against some of the most overtly 
exploitative aspects of for-profit human subject research (Elliott, 2010). Favorable 
university policies, by demonstrating an established, legal market for these products, 
justify proper studies on their use while protecting the subjects of a Phase IV “real-
world” clinical trials, which follow large numbers of normal people a drug to more 
precisely determine effects and safety. 
This does not mean that colleges should be handing out stimulants like candy; 
close oversight of the process is vital to its integrity.  One failure of the current system is 
that it encourages gray-market abuse of the mental health system, to the detriment of the 
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system and its users.  Following Greely et al.’s (2008) recommendations for responsible 
use, cognitive enhancement should be overseen as one component of a whole system of 
education, not just a means to further increase competition in the high-end. Forcing 
students to articulate their goals for cognitive enhancement, rather than seek a diagnosis, 
is a step towards authentic self-knowledge. Some students may recognize that there are 
pressures they are not willing to accept, and adjust their life goals accordingly.  It is best 
that these epiphanies be reached early in life, rather than during a mid-life crisis where it 
might cause major disruptions to a person's self-image, career, and family. 
Widespread use of cognitive enhancement is not a given.  Academic policies of 
the type I am advocating will have widespread social consequences.  Students take what 
they learn in school into the real world, diffusing cognitive enhancement into society.  
Even so, path-dependency means that the exact nature of our transhuman future is 
undetermined, and that if these technologies fall into the wrong hands, the future could 
become a very unpleasant place.  How things fall out will depend on the policies of the 
first effective transhumanist organizations. Facilitating better habits about cognitive 
enhancement substances in college may improve outcomes throughout life. 
Allow me to lay out some scenarios.  Democratic nations are too diverse to enact 
active transhumanist policies; we cannot come to a consensus on basic issues like 
healthcare, reproductive rights, and energy policy. How then can democracies expect to 
bring together a coalition for the reformation of the human species?  The kinds of nation-
states that are best positioned to pursue transhumanist policies are authoritarian capitalist 
nations like China and Singapore, or wealthy tax-enclaves like Monaco and the Bahamas.  
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From this, we wind up with the much castigated rich-poor divide, or a resurgent fascism.  
Neither is acceptable. 
Liberal policies could permit individuals to pursue transhuman lives, but some 
will be left out of the transhuman revolution.  Ad hoc pursuit of transhumanism might 
lead to a deadly cycle of reaction as conservatives try to suppress a nascent transhuman 
movement with a base in urban liberalism, exacerbating current culture wars.  
Transhumanists, under pressure and seeing themselves as above the mass of humanity, 
might be the victims of crime, as wearable computing pioneer Steve Mann already has 
been (Rottblatt, 2012). If enhancement is expensive, and sponsored by employers, it 
would further tie humans to corporate interests and lead to enhanced intelligence and 
other abilities in service of the extraction of profit rather than seeking the good life, 
wherever it may be found. 
Universities are uniquely situated to guide transhumanism in a benign manner.  A 
commitment to diversity and the pursuit of knowledge orient proto-transhumans towards 
responsible use of their abilities.  The policies and attitudes established by a university, 
which is less directly subject to political or economic influence, would most likely be 
more balanced and rational than those originating in the bodies described above.  Though 
nations, corporations, and individuals will have to come to terms with transhumanism, 
having universities frame the parameters of the debate would help all parties consider the 
issues fully, and discuss policies that match our social goals.  As students spread out into 
the real world, they will bring with them their attitudes towards and use of cognitive 
enhancement.  Universities have a responsibility towards their students and the wider 
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communities to make sure their policies are a positive force, and not a source of 
confusion. 
The various transhumanist programs described in the first part of this chapter have not 
met with success because their goals are more ambitious than the realities of scientific 
research can support, but also because the movement is a haven for visionaries, 
enthusiasts, and cranks, not system builders.  Similarly, bioconservatives are right to be 
concerned about enhancements beholden to no one, not even their inventors.  But power 
can be constrained, turned in positive directions, distributed and governed. The problems 
of transhumanist hype, bioconservative fears, and the erosion of liberal values in the 
university discussed in Chapter Three have a common solution.  Stimulant medications 
used for cognitive enhancement have already entered the university via the backdoor of 
the ADHD epidemic, itself a consequence of interactions between psychiatry and the 
enactment of novel rights. The challenge therefore becomes one of aligning the many 
pieces, technical, legal, and cultural, to ensure that future uses of cognitive enhancement 
flourish in the light of day, with the consent of users and those who consciously choose 
not to use, rather than continuing to lurk in the gaps between the responsibilities of the 
medical and educational professions.  As the widespread use of stimulant medication by 
college students shows, something is being born, but without care and attention, it will be 
stillborn or monstrous. My proposals are far from definitive, and I doubt that more than a 
small minority of people will agree with the answers by the mainstream transhumanist 
movement.  We should all ask ourselves the question that drives transhumanism, stripped 
of its specific technologies or California influences:  What are we becoming?  
134 
REFERENCES 
Agamben, G. (1998a). Introduction to Homo Sacer. In T. C. Campbell & A. Sitze (Eds.), Biopolitics: a reader (pp. 134–144). Durham: Duke University Press. 
Agamben, G. (1998b). Biopolitics and the Rights of Man. In T. C. Campbell & A. Sitze (Eds.), Biopolitics: a reader (pp. 152–160). Durham: Duke University Press. 
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC Chapter 126 (1990). 
American Psychiatric Association, American Psychiatric Association, & Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics. (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. Washington, D.C.: APA. 
Archambault, R. D. (1964). Introduction. In John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings (pp. xiii–xxx). Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press. 
Aronowitz, R. A. (2001). When do symptoms become a disease. Annals of Internal Medicine, 134(9), 803.   
Arthur, W. B. (2009). The nature of technology : what it is and how it evolves. New York: Free Press. 
ASU Charter. (2015). ASU Office of the President. Retrieved from https://president.asu.edu/about/asucharter 
Austerman, J., & Muzina, D. J. (2014). Turning Attention to ADHD: U.S Medication Trends for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (p. 29). Express Scripts. 
Bargmann, C., & Newsome, W. (2013). Interim report: Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Working Group (p. 58). National Institutes of Health. Retrieved from http://braininitiative.nih.gov/pdf/09162013_interim_report_508C.pdf 
Barkley, R. A. (1997). Behavioral inhibition, sustained attention, and executive functions: Constructing a unifying theory of ADHD. Psychological Bulletin, 121(1), 65–94. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.1.65 
Barkley, R. A. (2006). The Relevance of the Still Lectures to Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: A Commentary. Journal of Attention Disorders, 10(2), 137–140. doi:10.1177/1087054706288111 
Barkley, R. A. (2008). Commentary on Excerpt of Crichton’s Chapter, On Attention and Its Diseases. Journal of Attention Disorders, 12(3), 205–206. doi:10.1177/1087054708320391 
135 
Bastedo, M. N. (2011). Curriculum in higher education: The organizational dynamics of academic reform. In P. G. Altbach, P. J. Gumport, & R. O. Berdahl (Eds.), American higher education in the twenty-first century: social, political, and economic challenges (3rd ed, pp. 409–432). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bavarian, N., Flay, B. R., Ketcham, P. L., & Smit, E. (2015). The Illicit Use of Prescription Stimulants on College Campuses: A Theory-Guided Systematic Review. Health Education & Behavior, 42(6), 719–729. http://doi.org/10.1177/1090198115580576 
Bell, S. E., & Figert, A. E. (2012). Medicalization and pharmaceuticalization at the intersections: Looking backward, sideways and forward. Social Science & Medicine, 75(5), 775–783. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.04.002 
Bijker, W., & Pinch, T. (1984). The social construction of facts and artefacts. Social Studies of Science, 14(3), 399–441. 
Blackwell, W. H., & Rossetti, Z. S. (2014). The Development of Individualized Education Programs: Where Have We Been and Where Should We Go Now? SAGE Open, 4(2). http://doi.org/10.1177/2158244014530411 
Bobb, A. J., Castellanos, F. X., Addington, A. M., & Rapoport, J. L. (2006). Molecular genetic studies of ADHD: 1991 to 2004. American Journal of Medical Genetics Part B: Neuropsychiatric Genetics, 141B(6), 551–565. doi:10.1002/ajmg.b.30086 
Bock, D. D., Lee, W.-C. A., Kerlin, A. M., Andermann, M. L., Hood, G., Wetzel, A. W., … Reid, R. C. (2011). Network anatomy and in vivo physiology of visual cortical neurons. Nature, 471(7337), 177–182. http://doi.org/10.1038/nature09802 
Bonnefan, J.-F., Shariff, A., & Rahwan, I. (2015). Autonomous vehicles need experimental ethics: are we ready for utilitarian cars? arXiv. 
Bousquet, M. (2008). How the university works: higher education and the low-wage nation. New York: New York University Press. 
Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (1999). Sorting things out : classification and its consequences. Cambridge, Mas. [etc.]: The MIT Press. 
Briggman, K. L., Helmstaedter, M., & Denk, W. (2011). Wiring specificity in the direction-selectivity circuit of the retina. Nature, 471(7337), 183–188. http://doi.org/10.1038/nature09818 
Bromley, E. (2006). Stimulating a normal adjustment: Misbehavior, amphetamines, and the electroencephalogram at the Bradley home for children. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 42(4), 379–398. doi:10.1002/jhbs.20192 
136 
Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the demos: neoliberalism’s stealth revolution (First Edition). New York: Zone Books. 
Buchanan, A. E. (2011). Beyond humanity?: the ethics of biomedical enhancement. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2015, October 26). Time use on an average weekday for full-time university and college students. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/tus/charts/students.htm 
Byrom, B. (2001). A Pupil and a Patient: Hospital-Schools in Progressive America. In Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky (Eds.), The New Disability History (pp. 133–156). New York: New York University Press. 
Carson, J. (2007). The measure of merit: talents, intelligence, and inequality in the French and American republics, 1750-1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Clynes, M. E., & Kline, N. S. (1995). Cyborgs and space. In C. H. Gray (Ed.), The cyborg handbook (pp. 29–34). New York: Routledge. 
Coates, K. M. (1985). The Education for All Handicapped Children Act Since 1975. Marquette Law Review, 69(51), 51–81 
Colker, R. (2002). The Death of Section 504. University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 35(1), 219–261. 
Compton, W. M., & Guze, S. B. (1995). The neo-Kraepelinian revolution in psychiatric diagnosis. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 245(4-5), 196–201. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02191797 
Conrad, P. (2007). The medicalization of society: on the transformation of human conditions into treatable disorders. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Conrad, P. Identifying Hyperactive Children: The Medicalization of Deviant Behavior (expanded edition, Ashgate Publishers, 2006). Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1976. 
Crichton, A. (1798). An inquiry into the nature and origin of mental derangement: comprehending a concise system of the physiology and pathology of the human mind, and a history of the passions and effects. New York: AMS Press. 
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (2003). A framework for consciousness. Nature Neuroscience, 6(2), 119–126. http://doi.org/10.1038/nn0203-119 
Crow, M. M. (2012). Science, technology, and democracy. In H. Tirosh-Samuelson & K. L. Mossman (Eds.), Building better humans?: refocusing the debate on transhumanism (pp. 13–18). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
137 
Crow, M. M., & Dabars, W. B. (2015). Designing the new American university. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Daniels, N. (2000). Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 9, 309–322. 
Davis, J. E. (2006). How medicalization lost its way. Society, 43(6), 51–56. doi:10.1007/BF02698486 
De Grey, A. D. N. J., & Rae, M. (2008). Ending aging: the rejuvenation breakthroughs that could reverse human aging in our lifetime. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin. 
Decker, H. S. (2013). The making of DSM-III: a diagnostic manual’s conquest of American psychiatry. New York: Oxford University Press. 
DeSantis, A. D., & Hane, A. C. (2010). “‘Adderall is Definitely Not a Drug’”: Justifications for the Illegal Use of ADHD Stimulants. Substance Use & Misuse, 45(1-2), 31–46. http://doi.org/10.3109/10826080902858334 
DeSantis, A. D., Webb, E. M., & Noar, S. M. (2008). Illicit Use of Prescription ADHD Medications on a College Campus: A Multimethodological Approach. Journal of American College Health, 57(3), 315–324. http://doi.org/10.3200/JACH.57.3.315-324 
Dewey, J. (1896). Interest in Relation to Training of the Will. In John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings (pp. 260–287). Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press. 
Dewey, J. (1899). The School and Society. In John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press. 
Dewey, J. (1934). Need for a Philosophy of Education. In John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings (pp. 3–14). Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press. 
Dewey, J. (1938). The Relation of Science and Philosophy as a Basis for Education. In John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings (pp. 15–22). Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press. 
Di Michael, S. (1969). The Current Scene. In The Vocational Rehabilitation of the Disabled (pp. 5–28). New York,, pp. 16 
Dietary supplement health and education act of 1994, PL 103-417 (1994). 
Douglas, V. I. (1972). Stop, look and listen: The problem of sustained attention and impulse control in hyperactive and normal children. Canadian Journal of 
138 
Behavioural Science/Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Comportement, 4(4), 259–282. doi:10.1037/h0082313 
Drasgow, E., Yell, M. L., & Robinson, T. R. (2001). Developing Legally Correct and Educationally Appropriate IEPs. Remedial and Special Education, 22(6), 359–373. 
Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking rights seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, PL 94-142 773–796 (1975) 
Elliot, R. M. (1944). Occupational and Vocational Rehabilitation. Psychological Bulletin, 41(1), 47–56 
Elliott, C. (2010). White coat, black hat: adventures on the dark side of medicine. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Esposito, R. (2013). The Enigma of Biopolitics. In T. C. Campbell & A. Sitze (Eds.), Biopolitics: a reader (pp. 350–385). Durham: Duke University Press. 
Ettinger, R. C. W. (2005). The Prospect of Immortality. Palo Alto: Ria University Press. 
Fahey, T. B. (2014, May 27). Yes, we are: An interview with R. U. Sirius. Retrieved from http://www.tokesignals.com/yes-we-are-an-interview-with-r-u-sirius/ 
Finck, K. (2014, April 16). Living in the Adderall Generation: Part 2. The Middlebury Campus. Retrieved from https://middleburycampus.com/article/living-in-the-adderall-generation-part-2/ 
Flynn, J. R. (1987). Massive IQ gains in 14 nations: What IQ tests really measure. Psychological Bulletin, 101(2), 171–191. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.101.2.171 
Fontana, A., & Prokos, A. H. (2007). The interview: from formal to postmodern. Walnut Creek, Calif: Left Coast Press. 
Foucault, M. (1976). “Society must be defended,” Lecture at the College de France, March 17, 1976. In T. C. Campbell & A. Sitze (Eds.), Biopolitics: a reader (pp. 62–81). Durham: Duke University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1988). Madness and civilization : a history of insanity in the Age of Reason. New York: Vintage Books. 
Foucault, M. (1990). Right of Death and Power over Life. In R. Hurley (Trans.), The History of Sexuality Vol 1 (pp. 135–159). New York: Vintage Books. 
Foucault, M. (1994). The birth of the clinic : an archaeology of medical perception. New York: Vintage Books. 
139 
Frégnac, Y., & Laurent, G. (2014). Neuroscience: Where is the brain in the Human Brain Project? Nature, 513(7516), 27–29. 
Fukuyama, F. (2003). Our posthuman future: consequences of the biotechnology revolution. New York: Picador 
Getahun, D., Jacobsen, S. J., Fassett, M. J., Chen, W., Demissie, K., & Rhoads, G. G. (2013). Recent Trends in Childhood Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. JAMA Pediatrics, 167(3), 282. http://doi.org/10.1001/2013.jamapediatrics.401 
Goodwin, M. A. (2010, Spring). On the Other Side of Hyperactivity: An Anthropology of ADHD (Anthropology). University of California, Berkeley. 
Greely, H., Sahakian, B., Harris, J., Kessler, R. C., Gazzaniga, M., Campbell, P., & Farah, M. J. (2008). Towards responsible use of cognitive-enhancing drugs by the healthy. Nature, 456(7223), 702–705. http://doi.org/10.1038/456702a 
Greene, J. A. (2007). Prescribing by numbers : drugs and the definition of disease. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Greenhouse, E. (2015, October 7). Inside the Wesleyan Molly Bust. Rolling Stone. 
Gup, T. (2013, April 2). Diagnosis: Human. The New York Times. 
Gutmann, A., & Wagner, J. W. (2014). Gray matters: Integrative approaches for neuroscience, ethics, and society (p. 64). Washington, D.C.: Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. 
Hacking, I. (2001). The social construction of what? (8. printing). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press. pp 90. 
Haraway, D. (1991). A cyborg manifesto: science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. New York: Routledge. 
Hay, M. (2014, April 29). Humanity+ media. Retrieved from http://hplusmagazine.com/2014/04/29/could-a-machine-or-an-ai-ever-feel-human-like-emotions/ 
Hickel, K. W. (2001). Medicine, Bureacracy, and Social Welfare: The Politics of Disability Compensation for American Veterans of World War I. In Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky (Eds.), The New Disability History (pp. 236–267). New York: New York University Press. 
Hollowell, E. M., & Ratey, J. J. (1994). Driven to distraction. New York, N.Y: Simon & Schuster. 
140 
Howley, K. (2010, July 11). Until cryonics do us part. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/magazine/11cryonics-t.html 
Hughes, T. P. (1994). Technological momentum. In M.R. Smith & L. Marx (Eds.), Does technology drive history. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Illich, I. (1975). The medicalization of life. Journal of Medical Ethics, 1, 73–77. 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, PL 108‐446 (2004) 
Jameson, F. (2005). Archaeologies of the future: the desire called utopia and other science fictions. New York: Verso. 
Jasanoff, S. (Ed.). (2004). Ordering Knowledge, ordering society. In States of knowledge: The co-production of science and social order (pp. 13–45). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Johnson, W. B., & Mullen, C. A. (2007). Write to the top!: how to become a prolific academic (1st ed). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Karger, H., & Rose, S. R. (2010). Revisiting the Americans with Disabilities Act after Two Decades. Journal of Social Work in Disability & Rehabilitation, 9(2-3), 73–86. http://doi.org/10.1080/1536710X.2010.493468 
Khan, S., & Jerolmack, C. (2013). Saying Meritocracy and Doing Privilege. The Sociological Quarterly, 54(1), 9–19. http://doi.org/10.1111/tsq.12008 
Kass, L. R. (2003). Beyond therapy: Biotechnology and the pursuit of happiness. Washington, D.C.: The President’s Council on Bioethics. 
Klein, N. (2008). The shock doctrine: the rise of disaster capitalism. New York: Picador. 
Koene, R. A. (2013). Uploading to substrate-independent minds. In M. More & N. Vita-More (Eds.), The transhumanist reader: classical and contemporary essays on the science, technology, and philosophy of the human future (pp. 157–164). Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Kurzweil, R. (2006). The singularity is near: when humans transcend biology. New York, N.Y: Penguin Books. 
141 
Lange, K. W., Reichl, S., Lange, K. M., Tucha, L., & Tucha, O. (2010). The history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. ADHD Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorders, 2(4), 241–255. http://doi.org/10.1007/s12402-010-0045-8 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action : how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Lightman, A. (2009, Spring). Is the future cancelled or just postponed? H+ Magazine, 2. 
Mahoney, J. (2000). Path dependence in historical sociology. Theory and Society, 29, 507–548. 
Malacrida, C. (2004). Medicalization, Ambivalence and Social Control: Mothers’ Descriptions of Educators and ADD/ADHD. Health:, 8(1), 61–80. doi:10.1177/1363459304038795 
Markoff, J. (2006). What the dormouse said: how the sixties counterculture shaped the personal computer industry. New York: Penguin. 
Markram, H., & Hellgren-Kotaleski, J. (2015). HBP brain simulation platform v1-specifications document (p. 161). European Commission. 
Marks, H. M. (1997). The progress of experiment: science and therapeutic reform in the United States, 1900-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mayerson, A. B., & Mayer, K. S. (n.d.). Defining Disaiblity in the Aftermath of Sutton. Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund. Retrieved from http://dredf.org/publications/mayerson.html 
McCabe, S. E., West, B. T., Teter, C. J., & Boyd, C. J. (2014). Trends in medical use, diversion, and nonmedical use of prescription medications among college students from 2003 to 2013: Connecting the dots. Addictive Behaviors, 39(7), 1176–1182. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2014.03.008 
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, No. 348 F.Supp. 866 (1972) (United States District Court, District of Columbia. August 1, 1972). 
Montag, W. (2005.). Necro-economics: Adam smith and death in the life of the universal. In T. C. Campbell & A. Sitze (Eds.), Biopolitics: a reader (pp. 193–214). Durham: Duke University Press. 
Moravec, H. (1995). Mind children: the future of robot and human intelligence (4. print). Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 
142 
More, M. (2013). The philosophy of transhumanism. In M. More & N. Vita-More (Eds.), The transhumanist reader: classical and contemporary essays on the science, technology, and philosophy of the human future (pp. 3–17). Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
National Council on Disability. (1986). Toward Independence: An Assessment of Federal Laws and Programs Affecting Persons with Disabilities With Legislative Recommendations. Washington, D.C.  
Nelson, R. F., Bly, K., & Magaña, S. (2014). Freezing people is (not) easy: my adventures in cryonics. Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press. 
Neven, R. S., Anderson, V., & Godber, T. (2002). Rethinking ADHD: integrated approaches to helping children at home and at school. Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin. 
O’Conner, S. D. Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, Petitioners v. United Air Lines Inc, No. 97-1943 (Supreme Court of the United States). 
Office of Institutional Analysis. (2013). Arizona State University Enrollment Summary. 
Ong-Dean, C. (2009). Distinguishing disability: parents, privilege, and special education. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press. 
Pein, C. (2016, June). Everybody freeze: the extropians want your body. The Baffler, (30). Retrieved from http://thebaffler.com/salvos/everybody-freeze-pein 
Pellissier, H. (2011). Invent utopia now, transhumanist suggestions for the pre-singularity era. Wilcox Publishing. 
Rafalovich, A. (2001). Psychodynamic and Neurological Perspectives on ADHD: Exploring Strategies for Defining a Phenomenon. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 31(4), 397–418. doi:10.1111/1468-5914.00167 
Rafalovich, A. (2008). Framing ADHD children: a critical examination of the history, discourse, and everyday experience of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 
Rasmussen, N. (2009). On speed : the many lives of amphetamine. New York: New York University Press 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. PL 93-112 § 504 (1973). 
Reisinger, K. B., Rutledge, P. C., & Conklin, S. M. (2016). Study Drugs and Academic Integrity: The Role of Beliefs About an Academic Honor Code in the Prediction of Nonmedical Prescription Drug Use for Academic Enhancement. 
143 
Journal of College Student Development, 57(1), 65–78. http://doi.org/10.1353/csd.2016.0011 
Rennie, J. (2010, November 29). Ray Kurzweil’s slipper futurism. IEEE Spectrum. Retrieved from http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/ray-kurzweils-slippery-futurism 
Rose, N. S. (1990). Governing the soul: the shaping of the private self. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Rosenberg, C. E. (2002). The tyranny of diagnosis: specific entities and individual experiences. The Milbank Quarterly, 80, 237–260. 
Rottblatt, G. (2012, July 20). Steve Mann assaulted at French McDonald’s in world’s first “cybernetic hate crime.” Retrieved from http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/gabrielrothblatt2012071811 
Schwartz, P. (1996). The art of the long view: paths to strategic insight for yourself and your company. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group. 
Schwarz, A. (2012, June 9). Risky rise of the good-grade pill. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/education/seeking-academic-edge-teenagers-abuse-stimulants.html?_r=0 
Schweik, S. (2013). Lomax’s Matrix: Disability, Solidarity, and the Black Power of Section 504. In Foundations of disability studies (pp. 105–123). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sclar, D. A., Robison, L. M., Bowen, K. A., Schmidt, J. M., Castillo, L. V., & Oganov, A. M. (2012). Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Among Children and Adolescents in the United States: Trend in Diagnosis and Use of Pharmacotherapy by Gender. Clinical Pediatrics, 51(6), 584–589. http://doi.org/10.1177/0009922812439621 
Scotch, R. K. (2001). From good will to civil rights : transforming federal disability policy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp. 20 
Shapiro, J. P. (1994). No pity : people with disabilities forging a new civil rights movement. New York: Times Books. 
Skocpol, T. (1995). Protecting soldiers and mothers : the political origins of social policy in the United States. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Smith, M. E., & Farah, M. J. (2011). Are prescription stimulants “smart pills”? The epidemiology and cognitive neuroscience of prescription stimulant use by normal 
144 
healthy individuals. Psychological Bulletin, 137(5), 717–741. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0023825 
Stapley, G. (2015, January 8). New legislation targets predatory ADA lawsuits. The Modesto Bee. Modesto. Retrieved from http://www.modbee.com/news/local/article5657631.html 
Still, G. (1902). The Goulstonian Lectures On some abnormal psychical conditions in children. The Lancet, 159(4104), 1163–1168. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(01)74901-X 
Strohl, M. P. (2011). Bradley’s Benzedrine studies on children with behavioral disorders. The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, 84(1), 27–33. 
Switzer, J. V. (2003). Disabled rights : American disability policy and the fight for equality. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Szasz, T. (2010). The myth of mental Illness : foundations of a theory of personal conduct. New York: Harper Perennial 
Tezapsidis, E. (2013, August 9). Need for Speed. Berfois. Retrieved from http://www.berfrois.com/2013/08/elias-tezapsidis-need-for-speed/ 
The Pennsyvania Associaion for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 343 F. Supp. 279 (US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania May 5, 1972). 
Timimi, S., & Leo, J. (2009). Rethinking ADHD: from brain to culture. Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
United States Department of Education. (2014). Department of Education Special Education Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request. 
Vita-More, N., & Barranco, D. (2015). Persistence of Long-Term Memory in Vitrified and Revived Caenorhabditis elegans. Rejuvenation Research, 18(5), 458–463. http://doi.org/10.1089/rej.2014.1636 
Willcutt, E. G., Nigg, J. T., Pennington, B. F., Solanto, M. V., Rohde, L. A., Tannock, R., … Lahey, B. B. (2012). Validity of DSM-IV attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptom dimensions and subtypes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121(4), 991–1010. doi:10.1037/a0027347 
Williams, S. J., Martin, P., & Gabe, J. (2011). The pharmaceuticalisation of society? A framework for analysis: The pharmaceuticalisation of society? Sociology of Health & Illness, 33(5), 710–725. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9566.2011.01320.x 
Williams-Searle, J. (2001). Cold Charity: Manhood, Brotherhood, and the Transformation of Disability 1870-1900. In Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky 
145 
(Eds.), The New Disability History (pp. 157–186). New York: New York University Press. 
 
